GERMAN  PLANS 

for  the 

NEXT  WAR 

BY 

J.  B.W;  GARDINER 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 

Professor  Malbone  W.  Graham 


GERMAN  PLANS 
FOR  THE  NEXT  WAR 


GERMAN  PLANS 
FOR  THE  NEXT  WAR 


BY 


J.  B.  W.  GARDINER 

The  Military  Critic  of  the  "N.  Y.  Times" 


MAPS  IN  TEXT 


GARDEN  CITY  NEW  YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

1918 


Copyright,  igi8,  hy 
DotJBLEDAY,  Page  &  Company 

All  rights  reserved,  including  that  of 

translatiort  into  foreign  languages, 

including  the  Scandinavian 


a 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.   German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia  .        3 

II.  Germany's   Plans   for  the   Future 

Revealed 23 

III.  Despoliation  of  Belgium  Systematic 

AND  Not  Wanton 40 

IV.  Calais-Bagdad  not  Hamburg-Bagdad 

THE  German  Aim 63 

V.  "World  Empire  or  Downfall"       .      84 

VI.  Germany's  Peace  Drives — Past  and 

TO  Come 96 

VII.   German   Hostility  to   the   United 

States  Before  the  Present  War     107 

VIII.  No  Peace  Without  Victory  .     .     .     124 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

Mines  That  Are  the  Test  of  Victory      ...       36 

The  Destruction  of  Belgium 57 

Geography  of  Serbian  Exile 73 

Russia  and  the  Resources  Germany  Means  to 
Organize  for  her  own  Benefit    ....     88-89 


GERMAN  PLANS 
FOR  THE  NEXT  WAR 


GERMAN  PLANS 
FOR  THE  NEXT  WAR 

CHAPTER  1 

GERMAN  AIMS   IN    EUROPE   AND   ASIA 

The  development  of  the  present  German  Empire 
into  the  great  but  unscrupulous  power  which 
planned  and  initiated  the  Great  War  began 
with  the  Austro-Prussian  war  of  1866.  This  was 
the  beginning  of  the  Prussian  lust  for  power  and 
conquest,  the  beginning  of  the  policy  of  aggres- 
sion which   found   its  crystallization  in   19 14. 

Immediately  after  defeating  Austria,  Prussia 
formed  the  North  German  Confederation,  a 
loose  and  unstable  combination  of  the  German 
states,  merely  as  a  necessary  step  in  the  develop- 
ment of  German  power  in  Europe.  This  com- 
bination was  not  intended  to  be  permanent;  it 
had  none  of  the  characteristics  of  a  permanent 
organization.  But  it  was  necessary  as  a  prepara- 
tory measure,  preparing  the  German  mind  for  a 

3 


4  German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

more  closely  knit  union  of  states  which  was  to 
follow. 

The  plan  was  Prussia's,  and  Prussia  meant  to 
assume  the  lead,  meant  to  be  the  dominating 
element  in  all  Germany.  The  other  states  needed 
to  become  accustomed  to  Prussia's  leading  strings 
before  the  eventual  permanent  state  was  formed. 

The  final  step  was  soon  taken.  Gathering  clouds 
of  war  with  France  furnished  both  the  reason  and 
the  excuse,  and  under  the  guidance  of  Prussia, 
the  North  German  Confederation  was  turned  in- 
to the  German  Empire.  The  war  with  France 
taught  the  new  German  Empire  that  war  could 
be  an  extremely  profitable  enterprise. 

The  taste  of  power  and  of  the  fruits  of  victory 
which  Germany  obtained  in  1871  soon  developed 
into  gluttonous  desire.  Under  the  guidance  of 
Bismarck,  the  first  to  dream  of  Pan-Germanv, 
the  campaign  for  universal  empire  began. 

The  first  step  in  the  campaign  was  to  educate 
the  German  people  to  the  idea.  This  was  done  by 
intensive  propa_ganda,  which  was  launched  by 
a  school  of  philosophy  headed  by  Nietzsche,  a 
school  which  preached  incessantly  the  righteous- 
ness of  war  for  the  sake  of  war,  and  the  duty  of  a 
nation  to  wage  war  lest,  in  addiction  to  the  arts  of 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia         5 

peace,  a  people  should  become  weak  and  effem- 
inate, and  their  progress  retarded.  "Ye  shall 
love  peace,"  said  Nietzsche,  "as  a  means  to  new 
wars:  and  the  short  peace  rather  than  the  long.'* 
And  this  summed  up  the  dogma  of  the  entire 
school  of  which  he  was  such  a  powerful  exponent. 

This  idea  took  root  and  soon  there  were  hun- 
dreds of  men  in  Germany  expounding  the  same 
doctrine  in  the  name  of  the  Fatherland.  Not  a 
single  avenue,  which  might  lead  to  the  extension 
of  the  idea  of  the  righteousness  of  brute  force, 
of  the  duty  of  might  to  overrule  right,  was 
neglected.  In  almost  every  leading  university,  in 
almost  every  school  and  from  almost  every  pulpit 
these  ideas  were  taught  and  disseminated,  until 
all  of  Germany  was  rotten  with  their  insidious 
poison.  The  Pan-German  party  therefore  lived 
and  thrived  and  with  widely  extended  member- 
ship, spread  over  the  entire  empire,  taking 
supremacy  in  all  matters  of  state,  in  spite  of 
the  growth  of  socialism. 

Under  the  present  Kaiser,  the  Pan-German 
dream  was  reduced  to  a  definite  form  and  definite 
steps  were  taken  to  turn  this  dream  into  a  reality. 
These  steps  consisted  in  secret  preparations  for 
war,  a  war  which  Germany  proposed  to  launch 


6  German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

as  soon  as  she  felt  the  chances  for  success  were 
most  favorable.  The  time  was  ripe  in  191 4  and  the 
Serajevo  incident  furnished  the  excuse. 

It  is  not  the  intention  here  to  enter  into  a 
discussion  of  the  origin  of  the  great  war.  It  is, 
indeed,  unnecessary,  since  it  has  been  proven 
beyond  all  doubt  that  the  war  owes  its  begin- 
ning to  Germany,  to  German  ambition,  to  Ger- 
man lust  for  power  and  gain.  But  in  this  con- 
nection, I  will  do  no  more  than  quote  Maximilian 
Harden,  who,  in  1914,  not  only  acknowledged 
the  truth,   but  defended  it. 

"This  war,"  he  writes,  "has  not  been  forced 
on  us  by  surprise;  we  desired  it  and  were  right  to 
do  so.  Germany  goes  into  it  because  of  her  im- 
mutable conviction  that  what  she  has  accom- 
plished gives  her  the  right  to  wider  outlets  for 
her  activities  and  more  room  in  the  world." 
These  "wider  outlets,"  this  "more  room  in  the 
world,"  are  the  dreams  of  the  Pan-Germanist, 
the  distinct  aims  for  which  Germany  is  now  at 
war. 

It  is  popularly  considered  that  the  Pan-Ger- 
manic doctrine  led  to  an  expansion  of  Germany 
only  toward  the  east,  that  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  line,  the  line  of  the  Oriental  railroad  and 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia         7 

its  bordering  lands,  was  the  limit  of  German 
ambitions.  This  was  the  Pan-German  ambition 
of  1895;  it  is  not  the  ambition  of  191 2,  the  ambi- 
tion which  led  Bernhardi,  the  disciple  of  Nietzsche, 
to  plead  for  world  power  or  downfall.  This  latter 
dream  extended  westward  as  well  as  eastward, 
to  the  coast  of  France  and  Belgium  as  well  as  to 
the  shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  is  borne  out 
by  the  fact  that  Germany,  who  in  her  plans  for 
war  had  carefully  calculated  every  step,  delib- 
erately selected  the  western  front  as  the  main  scene 
of  military  endeavor.  A  brief  analysis  of  this 
selection  will  show  why  the  conclusion  that 
Germany  intended  to  expand  westward  is  in- 
evitable. 

At  the  outset  we  may  lay  down  the  undebatable 
theory  of  warring  against  coalitions,  that  the 
only  way  to  win  is,  as  Napoleon  did  on  several 
occasions,  break  the  coalition  and  defeat  its 
component  parts  separately.  In  the  particular 
case  at  hand,  Germany  found  herself  faced  with 
France  on  the  west  and  Russia  on  the  east. 
Great  Britain,  Germany  hoped  might  stay  out 
of  this  war  and  would  be  attended  to  later.  The 
logical  move  then  was  to  strike  against  the 
weaker  member  of  the  enemy,  defeat  it,  force  a 


8  German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

separate  peace,  and  then  turn  on  the  other. 
Either  wing,  if  struck  suddenly  with  the  full  force 
of  Germany,  unhampered  and  undiverted  by  any 
danger  from  the  other,  would,  before  defensive 
mobilization  could  be  effected,  be  crushed  and 
crumpled  like  a  house  of  cards. 

Let  us  then  examine  the  relative  strength  of 
eastern  and  western  enemies  of  Germany  on 
August  I,  1914,  in  order  to  determine  on  which 
front  the  logic  of  the  situation  demanded  that 
Germany  should  strike.  France,  through  her 
system  of  compulsory  military  service,  was 
already  well  recruited.  Her  standing  army  was 
nearly  a  million  men,  and  her  plans  for  mobili- 
zation could  bring  to  the  colors  an  additional 
force  equally  as  large.  Moreover,  having  since 
1 871  had  reason  to  fear  Germany,  she  was  more 
or  less  prepared  for  the  struggle.  There  was  the 
string  of  border  fortresses  for  defense — ^Verdun, 
Nancy,  Epinal,  Belfort — stretching  out  from 
Luxemburg  to  the  Swiss  frontier  blocking  the 
passage  of  the  Vosges  mountains.  There  was  an 
excellent  system  of  railroads  and  highways, 
second  not  even  to  those  of  Germany,  over  which 
troops  could  be  moved  with  great  rapidity. 
There  was  a  long  sea  coast  studded  with  open 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia         9 

ports  into  which  the  factories  of  the  world  could 
pour  their  munitions,  supplementing  those  of 
the  industries  of  France.  There  was  the  French 
navy,  second  to  that  of  Germany,  possibly,  but 
capable  of  protecting  the  country's  shipping. 
Finally  there  was  that  intangible  force — difficult 
to  measure  and  to  define  but  of  incalculable 
value — the  spirit  of  France,  a  spirit  which  Ger- 
many knew  existed  and  which,  in  intensity,  is 
not  less  strong  than  the  German  devotion  to 
the  Fatherland.  Indeed  this  spirit  had  many 
times  proven  itself  to  be  one  of  the  most  powerful 
forces  in  history;  a  force  which  never  flags,  that 
knows  no  defeat,  that  fights  beyond  the  point 
where  hope  is  dead, — and  still  wins. 

These  were,  briefly,  the  forces,  excluding  Great 
Britain,  which  Germany  had  to  face  when  she 
decided  to  strike  to  the  west. 

There  were  no  such  forces  as  these  in  Russia. 
The  Russian  bureaucracy,  in  the  first  place, 
was  made  up  of  men  the  great  majority  of  whom 
were  from  the  Baltic  provinces  and  who  were 
pro-Teuton  in  their  sympathies  rather  than 
pro-Slav.  The  Russian  people  were  not  united, 
the  spirit  of  patriotism  was  weak,  there  was  an 
absence  of  any  national  ideal  by  which  the  people 


lo       German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

were  united  into  that  solidarity  so  essential  to 
the  prosecution  of  a  war.  Manufacturing  re- 
sources were  limited  and  unorganized,  and  were 
concentrated  for  the  most  part  in  Russian  Poland, 
west  of  the  Vistula.  Russia  could,  moreover, 
be  cut  off  from  the  seas  except  at  Vladivostok, 
from  which  the  traffic  is  limited  by  a  single  and 
very  long  railroad  haul.  Thus  Russia  was  chiefly 
dependent  for  supplies  and  munitions  on  her 
domestic  manufactures,  except  during  the  sum- 
mer weather,  when  the  White  Sea  ports  would 
be  open.  In  addition  to  this,  Austria,  Germany's 
ally,  was  cut  off  completely  from  participating 
in  an  attack  on  France,  her  territory  stretching 
squarely  across  Russia's  southern  flank  in  Poland. 
From  this  accident  of  geography,  Austria,  if 
Germany  could  engage  Russia's  attention  on  the 
Poland  frontier,  could  outflank  the  Russian  army 
at  all  points  along  the  Galician  boundary. 

Had  Germany  struck  eastward  against  Russia, 
instead  of  westward  against  Belgium  and  France, 
what  would  have  been  the  result?  In  the  first 
place  England  proposed  to  Germany  that,  if  she 
would  preserve  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and 
direct  no  offensive  against  the  northern  coast  of 
France,  she  would  remain  neutral.    There  would 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia       ii 

also  have  been  a  great  difference  in  the  attitude 
of  France.  France  unquestionably  would  have 
lived  up  to  her  treaty  with  Russia.  But  there 
was  a  strong  pro-German  party  in  France  at 
the  time,  and  this  party,  if  the  sacred  soil  of 
France  had  remained  untouched,  would  have 
been  extremely  powerful.  France  with  the  Ger- 
mans on  her  soil  is  one  thing;  France  with  her 
soil  unscarified  by  the  German  heel  is  another. 
The  war  in  France  would  not  have  been  popular 
and  the  spirit  which  has  meant  so  much  to 
France  and  to  the  Entente  would  have  for  the 
most  part  been  lacking.  Russia,  in  such  case, 
would  have  received  the  full  force  of  a  blow 
delivered  with  the  combined  strength  of  Germany 
and  Austria. 

We  saw,  between  April  and  November  191 5, 
what  such  a  condition  would  bring  about.  Ger- 
many, although  holding  long  lines  in  the  west, 
turned  on  Russia,  and  in  this  short  time  all  but 
eliminated  her  from  the  war.  Had  this  blow 
been  delivered  nine  months  earlier  with  the 
additional  men  Germany  would  have  had  at  her 
command  through  confining  herself  to  defensive 
action  against  France,  the  entire  Russian  army 
could   have  been  destroyed,   and   the  Germans 


12        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

could  have  taken  the  Russian  capital.  An  inde- 
pendent peace  would  then  have  followed,  and 
Germany  would  have  been  left  free  to  deal  with 
France.  When  matters  had  reached  this  stage 
France,  which  entered  the  war  only  to  fulfill 
her  treaty,  also  would  have  made  peace,  and  the 
war  would  have  been  over  within  six  months. 
Germany's  rule  in  the  east  would  have  been 
unquestioned,  the  Russian  menace  would  have 
been  completely  done  away  with,  and  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  right  of  way  secured,  for 
Turkey  was  already  in  German  grasp. 

Why  was  this  not  done?  Why,  if  the  German 
dream  led  only  from  Hamburg  to  Bagdad,  did 
Germany  strike  west  when  there  were  such 
overwhelming  advantages  in  locating  the  war 
in  the  east?  Why  did  Germany  deliberately 
flaunt  Great  Britain  and  risk  drawing  her  into 
the  war,  when,  by  turning  to  the  east  instead  of 
the  west.  Great  Britain  would  have  remained 
neutral?  Why  did  Germany  ignore  the  fact  that 
in  1914  France,  if  not  invaded,  would  have  with- 
drawn from  the  war  if  Russia  had  made  peace, 
since  France  only  entered  the  war  through  her 
treaty  with  Russia? 

To  all  of  these  questions  we  can  find  but  the 


German  Aims  In  Europe  and  Asia       13 

one  answer.  It  is  that,  in  beginning  the  war, 
Germany  looked  to  a  westward  expansion  as 
fully  equal  in  importance  to  an  eastward  exten- 
sion of  her  sphere  of  influence.  She  figured  that 
by  coming  down  through  Belgium,  she  could 
take  Calais,  and  gain  control  of  the  Belgian 
coast  from  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  to  Hol- 
land. She  figured  that  she  would  flank  the  forti- 
fications of  Verdun  which  had  been  constructed 
to  defend  against  an  attack  from  the  east  but  not 
from  the  north,  break  a  gap  in  the  French  defen- 
sive line  at  this  point,  reach  Paris,  and  force  on 
France  a  peace  which  would  give  Germany  the 
French  iron  mines  of  Longwy  and  of  Brie.  She 
figured  that  the  possession  of  the  important 
strategic  coastal  cities  would  place  her  in  position 
to  begin  a  colonial  policy,  a  policy  of  expansion 
over  the  entire  world.  With  her  guns  pointed  at 
England's  throat  from  Antwerp,  Ostend  and 
Calais,  she  meant  to  begin  the  attack  on  the 
far  flung  British  Empire. 

Master  then  of  three-quarters  of  all  of  the  iron 
of  Europe,  France  reduced  to  a  second  or  third 
rate  power,  Germany  could  then  begin  a  naval 
development  which  would  eventually  wrest  from 
England  the  title  of  Mistress  of  the  Seas  and 


14        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

place  Germany  in  control  of  the  world  on  land 
and  sea.  "World  Power  or  Downfall,"  said 
Bernhardi  in  191 2.  But  how  could  world  power 
be  reached  without  destroying  France,  and  render- 
ing England  impotent?  No,  the  Pan-German 
dream  was  not  Hamburg  to  Bagdad,  but  Calais 
to  Bagdad. 

Once  France  was  conquered,  Germany  con- 
sidered that  it  would  be  very  simple  to  deal 
with  the  eastern  phase  of  Pan-Germania.  Russia 
would  not  last  three  months.  Petrograd  was 
swamped  with  sedition;  every  Russian  council 
was  filled  with  German  spies;  the  Russian 
Premier  himself  was  a  German  agent;  the  Russian 
qu«en,  sister  of  the  Kaiser,  was  loyal  to  her 
brother's  interests.  Russia  was  without  immedi- 
ately available  iron  and  coal,  without  sufficient 
factories;  she  had  not  the  equipment  with  which 
to  wage  war.  In  six  months  Russia  would  have 
become  as  truly  a  German  vassal  as  she  is  now, 
Serbia  would  have  been  eliminated,  and  the 
eastern  boundary  of  Germany  would  have  become 
conterminous  with  the  western  boundary  of 
Persia.  German  domination  of  both  the  European 
and  Asiatic  continents  would  now  be  complete. 

The  bibliography  of  Pan-Germania  is  replete 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia       15 

with  allusions  to  this  ambition.  Lest,  however, 
the  charge  be  made  that  quotations  from  Pan- 
German  writers  have  been  selected  prejudicially 
and  without  regard  to  the  general  context  from 
which  they  are  taken,  I  have  first  tried  to  show 
the  working  of  the  Pan-German  scheme  in  actual 
operation.  We  may,  however,  turn  now  to  this 
bibliography,  to  the  schemes  advanced  by  the 
Pan-German  writers  as  a  means  of  proving  that 
this  idea  of  a  western  expansion  is  combined, 
in  the  German  plan,  with  the  extension  of  Ger- 
manic influence  into  the  Near  East.  Through 
this  channel,  we  may  at  the  same  time  trace  the 
rapid  development  of  the  Pan-Germanic  theory, 
the  demands  of  which  in  1895  were  extremely 
modest  as  compared  with  the  land  hunger  as  it 
exists  to-day. 

"We  must  create  a  Central  Europe,"  said  Paul 
de  Lagarde,  writing  in  1905,  "which  will  guar- 
antee the  peace  of  the  entire  continent  from  the 
moment  when  it  shall  have  driven  the  Russians 
from  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Slavs  from  the  south, 
and  shall  have  conquered  large  tracts  to  the  east 
of  our  frontiers  for  German  colonization.  We 
cannot  let  loose,  ex  ahrupto,  the  war  which  will 
create  this  Central  Europe.    All  we  can  do  is  to 


i6        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

accustom  our  people  to  the  thought  that  this 
war  must  come."  And  at  this  juncture  we  might 
interpolate  that  the  process  of  driving  the  Rus- 
sians from  the  Black  Sea,  through  the  German- 
ization  of  the  new  state  of  Ukraine,  is  going  on 
apace,  and  that  the  Slavs  have  already  been 
driven  from  the  south.  Therefore  this  element 
in  the  foundation  of  the  Central  European 
Empire  has  already  become  a  fact. 

Writing  in  the  same  year,  and  showing  the 
desires  of  Pan-Germanists  westward,  another 
Pan-German  writer,  Joseph  Ludwig  Reimer,  has 
this  to  say  with  reference  to  all  of  Germany's 
smaller  neighbors: 

"Such  false  ideas  as  to  nationality,  speech  and 
race  are  prevalent  ...  that  it  is  often  main- 
tained that  no  breaking  up  of  nations  would  be 
necessary,  but  that  a  'Germanization'  in  the 
mass  of  the  nations  in  question  (Germany's 
smaller  neighbors)  would  be  sufficient." 

And  the  same  writer,  later  on,  in  his  book,  "A 
Pan-German  Germany, "  from  which  the  above 
extract  was  taken,  makes  this  definite  proposal, 
which,  be  it  noted,  strikes  westward  at  Holland: 

"We  desire,  and  must  desire  ...  a  world- 
empire  of  Teutonic  stock,  under  the  hegemony 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia       17 

of  the  German  people.     In  order  to  secure  this 
we  must — 

{a)  Gradually  Germanize  the  Scandinavian  and 

Dutch    Teutonic    States,    denationalizing 

them  in  the  weaker  significance  of  the  term; 

{h)  Break  up  the  predominantly  un-Teutonic 

peoples    into    their    component    parts,    in 

order  to  take  to  ourselves  the  Teutonic 

element  and  Germanize  it,  while  we  reject 

the  un-Teutonic  element." 

Professor  Ernst  Hasse,  writing  in  1906,  carries 

this  idea  somewhat  further  along  the  course  it 

has  since  taken: 

"The  territory  open  to  future  German  expansion 
.  .  .  must  extend  from  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Baltic  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  absorbing  the  Nether- 
lands and  Luxemburg,  Switzerland,  the  whole 
basin  of  the  Danube,  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and 
Asia  Minor." 

In  191 1,  to  come  nearer  down  to  the  present 
day,  Maximilian  Harden,  whose  word  is  partic- 
ularly valuable  in  view  of  the  position  he  has 
taken  on  German  war  aims  since  191 5,  empha- 
sized the  German  intention  to  spread  toward  the 
Atlantic: 

"Since  the  Western  Powers  restrict  our  right  to 


l8        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

life,  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  attach  one  of 
them  to  us,  or  that  we  should  sweep  them  out 
of  our  way   by   force." 

Which  one  was  to  be  attached?  Why  "sweep 
them  out  of  our  way  by  force"  unless  it  was  to 
expand  westward?  Belgium  was  in  Harden's 
mind;  Belgium  and  probably  France  as  well, 
since  they  are  the  only  two  powers  west  of  Ger- 
many that  in  any  way  hindered  Germany's 
growth;  Belgium,  from  the  fact  that  she  pos- 
sessed a  sea  coast;  France,  partly  for  the  same 
reason,  and  partly  because  of  her  economic 
importance  and  military  strength. 

And  finally  let  us  quote  the  official  corrobora- 
tion of  the  German  plan  to  expand  westward,  as 
well  as  eastward  and  southeast. 

A  German  socialist  deputy  obtained  and  read 
in  the  German  Reichstag  a  secret  memorandum 
sent  by  Chancellor  Michaelis  to  Austria  in 
1916.  This  memorandum  contained  the  follow- 
ing passages: 

"The  motive  of  all  of  Germany's  acts  is  the  lack 
of  territory,  both  for  the  development  of  commerce 
and  colonization.  Germany  has  to  solve  two 
problems — the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  the  opening 
of  a  route  to  the  southeast.  And  these  two  problems 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia       19 

can  only  be  solved  through  the  destruction  of 
England. 

"Our  object  is  the  permanent  securing  of  the 
German  Empire  in  Central  Europe  and  the  extension 
of  its  territory.  No  one  who  understands  the  sig- 
nificance of  this  war  can  doubt  that,  in  spite  of 
our  wish  to  be  moderate,  we  shall  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  deterred  from  extending  the  borders 
of  the  empire  and  from,  under  all  circumstances, 
annexing  such  territories  as  are  fitted  for  coloniza- 
tion and  are  not  subjected  to  the  influence  of  the 
sea  power. 

"We  can  weaken  her  (Russia)  materially  by  taking 
away  her  border  territories,  the  Baltic  provinces. 
By  using  skillful  policies  the  Baltic  provinces  can 
easily  be  Germanized.  They  will  be  settled  with 
Germans  and  their  population  will  double  itself. 
That  is  the  reason  why  they  must  be  annexed. 
The  frontier  between  the  German  Empire 
and  Poland  must  be  materially  altered.  .  .  . 
The  lakes,  which  we  shall  not  leave  in  the  hands 
of  the  Russians  at  any  price,  will  be  included 
within  our  borders. 

"In  the  Vosges  the  boundary  line  must  be  im- 
proved by  the  annexation  of  some  valleys,  so  that 
the  German  frontier  troops  can  no  longer  be  fired 
upon  from  French  territory.  France  will  lose  Briey 
and  a  strip  of  land  west  of  Luxemburg.  The  value 
of  Briey  in  an  economic  and  military  sense  is  evi- 
dent from  the  fact  that  16,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore 


20        German  Plans  for  the  Next  VV^ar 

are  produced  there.  For  the  safeguarding  of  the 
German  and  Luxemburg  iron  industry  Longwy 
must  remain  in  our  hands." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  continue  these  quota- 
tions further. 

The  quotations  which  have  been  used  are 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  Pan-German  scheme 
did  include  the  annexing  of  part  at  least  of  France 
and  Belgium  and  later  the  destruction  of  Eng- 
land; and  the  fact  that,  contrary  to  all  the  logic 
of  the  situation,  the  action  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment at  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  attacking 
through  France  and  Belgium  was  in  direct  further- 
ance of  the  Pan-German  plan.  It  is  unnecessary 
to  take  up  the  matter  of  expansion  toward  the 
east.  This  is  not  because  their  intention  to 
expand  eastward  and  establish  the  Hamburg- 
Bagdad  control  is  not  of  equal  importance.  Indeed 
in  so  far  as  the  peace  of  Europe — present  and 
future — is  concerned,  it  is  of  even  greater  impor- 
tance, since  if  the  eastern  object  of  the  Pan- 
German  scheme  be  frustrated,  the  entire  plan 
falls  to  the  ground.  But  as  the  military  situation 
stands,  the  eastern  phase  is  practically  a  fait 
accompli.  Serbia  has  been  demolished  and  the 
Belgrade-Nish  Hnk  in  the  Oriental  Railroad  is 


German  Aims  in  Europe  and  Asia       21 

secured;  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  are  totally  sub- 
dued through  economic  dependence  and  are  in  all 
things  subservient  to  their  Teutonic  masters; 
Austria  remains,  as  she  has  been  since  the  begin- 
ning, a  German  vassal.  A  part  of  Palestine  and 
of  eastern  Mesopotamia  as  far  as  Bagdad  is, 
it  is  true,  in  British  hands;  but  Russia  has 
failed,  the  British  are  alone  in  their  fight,  and 
the  activities  of  their  two  forces  can  not  decide 
the  war. 

But  whatever  of  the  German  ambition  in 
the  Near  East  remains  unachieved  through  these 
British  forces,  it  has  been  more  than  compen- 
sated for  by  the  annexations  in  Russia.  The 
German  gains  east  of  the  Prussian  frontier  have 
opened  a  vista  far  beyond  the  wildest  dreams 
of  the  most  rabid  Pan-Germanist;  and  what 
Germany  has  already  acquired  will  not  be  released 
unless  Germany  is  forced,  by  force  of  arms,  to 
disgorge. 

The  situation  in  the  west  is  essentially  different. 
What  Germany  holds  in  France  and  Belgium 
falls  irreparably  short  of  her  ambitions.  More- 
over, not  only  is  she  unable  to  go  farther,  but 
that  which  she  has  will  certainly  be  taken  away, 
and,  sooner  or  later,  she  must  eventually  fall  back 


22        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

behind  her  own  frontiers.  If  this  were  to  come 
about  through  a  peace  compromise  the  result  would 
merely  be  an  armed  truce.  The  German  ambition 
for  western  expansion  would  merely  sleep  to  awake 
later  in  another,  and  more  terrible  war.  There- 
fore I  have  emphasized  the  western  situation 
since,  because  of  its  relation  to  the  future,  it  is 
the  most  pregnant  with  danger. 


CHAPTER  II 
Germany's  plans  for  the  future  revealed 

In  presenting  the  evidence  that  Germany's 
thought  is  already  projecting  itself  into  another 
war,  that  preparations  are  already  being  not 
only  actively  considered  but  actually  made,  I 
shall  purposely  refrain  from  selecting  data 
from  the  German  press.  This  press  has,  for  the 
past  two  years,  been  filled  with  such  references, 
but  the  press  of  any  country  is  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  that  country's  intentions  or  of  the 
purposes  of  its  leaders.  We  may  say  that  a 
certain  paper  is  the  organ  of  this  or  of  that  party 
and  that  its  utterances  may  therefore  be  con- 
sidered as  having  an  atmosphere  of  official 
sanction.  This,  however,  is  open  to  dispute.  The 
object  here  is  not  to  delve  into  the  realm  of  con- 
troversial matters  but  to  present  only  those 
things  which  are  known  to  be  facts.  From  such 
facts,   and  we  cannot  dispute  facts,  we  are   at 

liberty  to  draw  conclusions  and  to  act  on  the 

23 


24        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

logical  consequences  of  the  facts  as  being  the 
most  probable  state  of  affairs  with  which  we  have 
to  contend.  From  official  Germany  herself, 
through  the  medium  of  prominent  German  offi- 
cials who  are  known  and  recognized  as  such  over 
the  entire  reading  world,  we  have  outspoken  and 
frank  statements  as  to  just  how  the  German  mind 
is  working  at  this  moment. 

Lieutenant-General  Baron  von  Freytag-Loring- 
hoven.  Deputy  Chief  of  the  German  General 
Staff,  ranks  officially  as  the  third  soldier  in  the 
German  Empire.  He  is  the  most  distinguished 
writer  in  the  German  army,  and  the  only  officer, 
since  the  war  began,  to  be  decorated  with  the 
Ordre  Pour  le  Merite,  Peace  Class,  which  is 
conferred  for  distinction  in  science  and  arts.  A 
word  as  to  the  personal  characteristics  of  this 
officer  will  give  an  idea  as  to  how  much  weight 
we  may  place  upon  what  he  has  to  say.  He  is 
distinctly  not  of  the  swaggering,  swashbuckling, 
boastful  type  of  German  officer  so  frequently 
met  with,  in  peace  days,  in  the  streets  of  Berlin 
and  of  the  other  German  cities.  On  the  contrary, 
he  is  distinctly  of  the  student  type,  arguing 
dispassionately,  and  appreciating  with  commen- 
datory fairness  and  sincerity  the  good  qualities 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     25 

and  fighting  ability  of  Germany's  present  ene- 
mies, and  of  the  probable  enemies  of  the  future. 
For  the  past  two  or  three  years  he  has  been 
regarded  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the  German 
army,  and  it  may  therefore  be  assumed  that  what 
he  has  to  say  bears  at  least  the  imprint  of  approval 
from  military  Germany. 

He  has  furnished  us  with  a  book  entitled 
"Deductions  from  the  World  War,"  in  which  he 
discusses  broadly  and  calmly  the  applications  of 
this  war's  lessons  to  the  next,  and  what  prepara- 
tions Germany  must  make  so  that  the  errors  of 
the  present  conflict  may  not  be  repeated  when 
the  next  war  is  launched.  His  book  was  never 
intended  to  reach  either  neutral  countries  or 
Germany's  enemies.  It  was  written  entirely  for 
German  consumption  and  German  benefit.  Its 
circulation  was  greatly  encouraged  by  the  Ger- 
man Government,  but  because  of  the  writer's 
candor  in  avowing  Germany's  intention  to  pre- 
pare for  the  next  war  as  soon  as  circumstances 
permit,  all  newspaper  criticism  was  prohibited 
by  the  censor  and  the  export  of  the  book  abso- 
lutely forbidden.  A  few  copies,  however,  managed 
to  leak  through  the  barriers  imposed  by  the 
Government  and  the  book  has  been  translated 


26        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

and  published  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States. 

Baron  von  Freytag-Loringhoven  first  discusses 
the  general  question  of  peace,  of  disarmaments, 
and  of  arbitration.  Incidentally  it  may  be  noted 
he  has  made  reference  to  Germany's  intention  to 
obtain  world  power,  about  which  so  much  has 
been  written : 

"It  may  be  asked,  What  is  the  use  of  all  this? 
Will  not  the  general  exhaustion  of  Europe,  after 
the  world  conflagration,  of  a  certainty  put  the 
danger  of  a  new  war,  to  begin  with,  in  the  back- 
ground, and  does  not  this  terrible  slaughter  of 
nations  point  inevitably  to  the  necessity  of  dis- 
armaments to  pave  the  way  to  permanent  peace? 
The  reply  to  that  is  that  nobody  can  undertake 
to  guarantee  a  long  period  of  peace  and  that  a 
lasting  peace  is  guaranteed  only  by  strong  arma- 
ments. Our  own  armament,  although  it  may  have 
been  defective  in  some  respects,  has  none  the  less 
secured  peace  for  us  for  forty  years,  that  is  to 
say,  for  such  a  length  of  time  as  has  hardly  ever 
before  been  experienced  in  the  world's  history 
in  the  case  of  a  great  country." 

Here  not  only  is  cleverly  and  plausibly  laid 
down  an  excuse  to  the  German  people  for  the 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     27 

remarkable  state  of  military  preparedness  and 
for  their  huge  ante-war  expenditures,  but  with 
equal  cleverness,  the  mind  is  prepared  for  a 
continuation  of  this  condition  after  the  present 
war  is  over.    But  to  continue  the  quotation. 

"Moreover,  world  power  is  inconceivable  with- 
out striving  for  expression  of  power  in  the  world, 
and  consequently  for  sea  power.  But  this  involves 
the  constant  existence  of  a  large  number  of 
potential  causes  of  friction.  Hence  arises  the 
necessity  for  adequate  armaments  on  land  and 
sea.  ...  A  long  peace,  such  as  that  which  pre- 
ceded the  World  War,  had  frequently  caused  us 
to  overlook  the  fact  that  it  was  not  the  fine 
phrases  about  international  bUss  and  brotherhood, 
uttered  on  every  occasion  at  public  meetings, 
which  preserved  us  from  war,  but  the  might  of  our 
sword,  which  was  only  fully  revealed  on  the  out- 
break of  hostilities.  And  it  will  only  be  by  this 
might  that  we  shall  be  able  to  safeguard  peace 
in  the  future." 

If  we  had  the  slightest  reason  to  believe  in  Ger- 
many's good  faith;  if  we  did  not  know  that  she 
is  unscrupulous,  deceitful,  without  any  con- 
ceptions of  national  honor  as  that  term  is  under- 
stood by  the  civilized  people  of  the  world;     if 


28        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Germany's  history  did  not  prove  that  she  cannot 
have  power  without  abusing  it,  we  might  interpret 
the  latter  part  of  the  last  quotation  as  a  reason- 
able step  for  the  preservation  of  the  nation.  But 
it  is  Germany's  abuse  of  power  that  we  have 
learned  to  fear;  not  her  use  of  it.  And  with  our 
knowledge  of  what  Germany  would  do  with 
military  power  in  the  future,  should  we  be  safe  in 
permitting  her  to  end  the  war  with  her  military 
strength  unimpaired,  relatively  stronger  indeed 
than  it  was  in  1914?  In  the  same  paragraph  in 
which  General  von  Freytag-Loringhoven  demands 
a  strong  military  body  as  a  defensive  measure, 
has  he  not  expressly  stated  Germany's  desire  for 
world  power? 

Later  in  his  book  he  gives  us  again  new  cause 
for  fear;  insinuating,  in  terms  so  plain  that  it  is 
impossible  to  mistake  his  meaning,  just  what  the 
German  attitude  will  be  toward  future  treaties, 
which,  in  the  mind  of  the  military  leaders,  pre- 
vent German  expansion.  In  the  same  extract 
we  also  learn  something  about  the  German 
opinion  of  a  league  of  nations,  banded  together 
in  the  interests  of  peace: 

"We  misconstrue  reality,  if  we  imagine  that  it 
is  possible  to  rid  the  world  of  war  by  means  of 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     29 

mutual  agreements.  Such  agreements  willj^in 
the  future  as  in  the  past,  be  concluded  from  time 
to  time  between  states.  The  further  development 
of  international  courts  of  arbitration  and  the 
elimination  of  many  causes  of  dispute  by  their 
agency  lie  within  the  realms  of  possibility,  but 
any  such  agreements  will  after  all  only  be  treaties 
which  will  not  on  every  occasion  be  capable  of 
holding  in  check  forces  seething  within  the  states. 
...  In  any  event,  as  regards  us  Germans,  the 
World  War  should  disencumber  us  once  and  for 
all  of  any  vague  cosmopolitan  sentimentality. 
If  our  enemies,  both  our  secret  and  our  avowed 
enemies,  make  professions  of  this  nature,  that 
is  for  us  sufficient  evidence  of  the  hypocrisy 
which  underlies  them." 

In  taking  up  the  present  war  and  discussing 
German  failures  and  mistakes  he  dwells  at  some 
length  on  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  Germany's 
first  admission  that  there  was  such  a  battle  or  that 
a  defeat  was  suffered  in  the  first  mad  rush  forward 
in  1914. 

The  next  war  must  be  so  planned,  he  informs 
us,  that  Germany  may  keep  on  the  offensive 
and  that  there  shall  be  no  subsidence  into  trench 
warfare;   a  war  of  movement  shall  be  maintained 


30        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

from  the  outset.  The  Germans  failed  at  the 
Marne  because  they  were  not  strong  enough  to 
break  down  France,  and  this  mistake  must  not 
occur  in  the  next  war,  he  tells  us. 

"If  at  that  time  no  decisive  victory  fell  to  our 
share,  and  our  strength  proved  insufficient  to 
vanquish  France,  we  must  none  the  less  consider 
that  up  to  the  Marne  we  had  achieved  enormous 
things.  'In  the  very  moment  of  accomplishment,' " 
he  says,  quoting  a  Swiss  military  critic,  "  'the 
completion  of  the  battle  was  abandoned  for 
far-reaching  general  reasons.  .  .  .  The  battle 
was  broken  off  by  the  German  Supreme  Com- 
mand, and  in  view  of  the  general  situation,  a 
strategic  retreat  to  a  new  line  was  ordered.' 
This  is  the  judgment  of  a  neutral  writer  on  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  and  certainly  it  would  have 
taken  very  little  to  turn  the  scale  so  that  victory 
might  have  fallen  to  us  and  a  retreat  been  avoided. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  German  armies  after  the 
dazzling  successes  which  had  been  achieved  at 
the  beginning  could  not  but  in  the  nature  of 
things  cause  bitter  disappointment  at  home." 

He  then  lays  down  the  guiding  principles  which 
shall  actuate  the  German  preparations  for  the 
next  conflict; 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     3 1 

"Our  business  therefore  is  to  maintain  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  war  as  they  lived  in  the 
German  army  up  to  the  year  1914,  to  soak  them 
in  the  experiences  of  the  present  war,  and  to 
make  the  fullest  technical  use  of  these  experiences; 
but  to  do  all  this  without  giving  an  entirely 
new  direction  to  our  thinking  on  strategy  and 
tactics." 

"We  shall  have  to  consider  how,  in  future, 
to  preserve  for  war  the  character  of  the  war 
of  movement,  all  the  more  so,  since  in  the 
World  War  it  has  only  been  by  the  war  of  move- 
ment that  we  have  reaped  decisive  results.  It 
will,  of  course,  be  accompanied  by  many  of  the 
features  of  intrenched  warfare,  and,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  necessity  of  bringing  up  and  setting 
in  operation  the  numerous  present-day  methods 
of  attack,  it  will  be  slow." 

"The  spirit  of  the  offensive  which  is  peculiar 
to  our  army  we  must  study  to  preserve  by  every 
means  in  our  power.  It  has  achieved  striking 
results  in  this  war,  and  has  recently  once  again 
proved  its  effectiveness  in  the  summer  of  191 7 
in  Eastern  Galicia  and  in  the  defensive  battles 
in  Northern  France  and  Flanders." 

He  seems  to  feel  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  the 


32        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

army  being  democratized,  which  from  his  point 
of  view  would  be  a  German  calamity.  He  there- 
fore makes  use  of  the  following  quotation  from 
Prince  Buelow  to  prove  his  assertion: 

"The  spirit  of  German  militarism,  as  Prussia 
first  developed  it  and  Germany  adopted  it,  is 
every  whit  as  monarchical  as  it  is  aristocratic 
and  democratic,  and  it  would  cease  to  be  German, 
and  the  mighty  expression  of  German  imperial 
military  power  and  military  efficiency,  were  it  to 
change.  If  our  enemies,  to  whom  with  God's 
help  our  militarism  will  bring  defeat,  abuse  it, 
we  know  that  we  must  preserve  it,  for  to  us  it 
means   victory   and   the  future  of  Germany." 

As  to  general  conclusions,  the  following  quota- 
tions will  suffice. 

"The  war  has,  on  the  one  hand,  revealed  to  us 
the  full  financial  strength  of  Germany;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  has  proved  that  additional 
expenditure  on  the  army  at  the  right  time  would 
have  been  profitable.  We  should  then  have  saved 
in  this  war  not  only  millions  of  marks,  but  in 
all  probability  we  should  have  had  to  offer  up 
a  far  less  considerable  sacrifice  of  men.  In  view 
of  the  central  position  of  the  Fatherland,  larger 
expenditure   on   the   land-army,   in   addition   to 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     33 

the  necessary  expenditures  on  the  fleet,  was 
absolutely  essential. 

"The  demands  which  in  this  connection  were 
put  before  the  Reichstag  were  but  a  feeble  min- 
imum of  what  was  really  desirable,  as  the  World 
War  has  proved.  .  .  .  We  have  to  learn  from 
it  the  lesson  that  in  future  we  must  disregard 
every  objection,  and  must  see  to  it  that  the  dis- 
proportion between  the  credits  which  are  asked 
for  and  what  has  to  be  done  in  case  of  war  shall 
in  any  case  never  again  be  so  great  as  it  was  in 
the  World  War. 

"In  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  the  German 
people  will  have  to  seek  firm  cohesion  in  its 
glorious  army  and  in  its  belaureled  young  fleet." 

I  have  dilated  to  such  an  extent  on  this  volume 
because  the  deliberation,  the  freedom  from  chau- 
vinistic tendencies,  and  the  fairness  of  its  reason- 
ing make  it  peculiarly  impressive  reading.  The 
object  of  the  volume  is  very  plain.  It  is  free  from 
the  slightest  attempt  to  dissemble  or  to  avoid 
the  issue.  It  is  simply  to  point  out  the  errors  which 
the  present  war  has  revealed,  and  to  show  how,  in 
the  preparations  which  are  now  under  way  for 
the  next  war,  the  mistakes  of  the  present  may 
be  avoided. 


34        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

We  shall  return  later,  in  discussing  Belgium, 
to  the  current  military  thought  of  Germany, 
but  for  the  present  we  may  dispense  with  it 
and  see  what  civilian  Germany  thinks  of  these 
war  preparations. 

In  December  191 7  the  Association  of  German 
Manufacturers  of  Iron  and  Steel  and  the 
Association  of  German  Metallurgists,  with 
headquarters  at  Berlin  and  DiisseldorfF,  drew 
up  a  memorial  which  was  addressed  to  the 
German  Government  and  to  the  German  High 
Military  Command,  demanding  that  Germany 
annex  the  French  iron  areas  centering  in 
Longwy  and  Briey  because  of  their  "extreme 
importance  for  German  national  economy  and 
for  the  conduct  of  future  wars."  A  copy  of 
this  memorial,  which  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
French  authorities,  furnishes  most  positive 
evidence  that  the  large  commercial  organi- 
zations of  Germany  are  in  exactly  the  same 
frame  of  mind  as  is  the  military  element. 
The  importance  of  the  iron  of  Lorraine  and  of 
the  Briey  basin  has  of  course  been  widely 
recognized.  This  indeed  was  the  dominating 
element  which  inspired  in  Germany  her  desire 
for  a  western  expansion  which  was  discussed 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     35 

in  the  first  part  of  this  volume.  This  subject 
is  gone  into  with  elaborate  care  as  is  also  the 
relation  of  both  French  and  German  Lorraine 
to  the  present  war.  "If,  with  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  in  1914,  the  French  had  destroyed 
their  own  iron  mines  of  the  Briey  and  Longwy 
basins,  which  later  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Germans,  and  at  the  same  time  with  their  long- 
range  guns  destroyed  the  iron  mines  on  the 
German  side  of  the  Lorraine  frontier,  the 
war  could  not  have  lasted  more  than  a  few 
months." 

Continuing,  this  memorial  demands  that 
the  frontier  be  pushed  westward  not  only  to 
include  the  present  French  iron  deposits,  but 
to  place  them  beyond  the  range  of  the  French 
artillery.  Only  in  this  way,  it  states,  can 
France  be  prevented  from  checking  Germany's 
future  wars. 

Further,  the  memorial  points  out  that  the 
life  of  Germany's  own  deposits  is  not  more 
than  fifty  years  and  concludes  as  a  conse- 
quence: 

"Let  no  one  believe  that  Germany  in  peace 
time  will  be  able  to  assure  herself  iron  reserves 
for  a  future  war.  And  let  no  one  dare  to  pretend 


36        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 


on  his  own  responsibility  that  such   iron  re- 
serves would  be  sufficient. 

"During  the  first  forty  months  of  this  war 


MINES  THAT  ARE  THE  TEST  OF  VICTORY 

The  loss  of  the  iron  mines  of  Lorraine  would  mean,  to  Germany, 
the  loss  of  more  than  half  of  her  total  supply  of  iron  ore,  upon 
which,  in  turn,  depends  the  all-essential  supply  of  guns,  shells, 
and  rails  for  the  German  Army.  With  ^these  mines  in  Allied 
hands,  therefore,  Germany  could  not  long  continue  to  prosecute 
the  war 

Germany,  in  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  her 
national  defense,  spent  over  50,000,000  tons  of 
iron  and  steel. 

"We  do  not  have  the  right  to  count  that  in 
a  future  war  we  will  have  the  good  fortune 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     37 

a  second  time  to  be  able  to  exploit  the  terri- 
tories occupied  and  to  increase  our  resources 
of  first  materials." 

Taking  up  the  use  of  steel  in  the  next  war, 
and  following  in  a  general  way  the  idea  empha- 
sized so  strongly  by  General  von  Freytag- 
Loringhoven,  the  memorial  states: 

**For  the  future  war  it  is  necessary  that  we 
dispose  of  considerable  resources  in  German 
ore,  for  the  richer  an  industrial  nation  is  in  iron 
ore  the  greater  it  is  feared  by  its  enemies. 

"In  the  future  it  will  not  be  masses  of  men 
grouped  in  gigantic  armies  that  will  decide  the 
war,  but  above  all  defensive  and  offensive 
instruments  of  perfected  technic  placed  at  the 
disposition  of  the  combatants  in  sufficient 
quantities  and  constantly  renewed. 

LORRAINE    AS    A    PROTECTION 

"It  is  thus  that  the  mineral  districts  of 
Lorraine,  to  which  we  are  already  indebted 
for  not  having  been  annihilated  in  the  present 
war,  will  protect  us  in  the  future  war  and  permit 
us  to  assure  the  welfare  of  the  empire  and  at 
the  same  time  spare  the  blood  of  the  people. 

"It  is  necessary  to  see  in  the  seizure   by 


38        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Germany  of  all  of  Lorraine  not  merely  a  war 
indemnity  and  a  source  of  vigor  for  the  father- 
land, but  also  a  guarantee  of  a  durable  peace 
and  of  security  for  the  fatherland." 

We  thus  have  from  the  highest  military 
source  and  from  a  civilian  source  equally  high, 
frequent  and  emphatic  references  to  what  is  in 
the  German  mind  at  this  moment — and  all 
corroborated  by  Chancellor  Michaelis's  memo- 
randum to  Austria.  If  we  wish  to  turn  to  the 
political  factors  and  ascertain  whether  the 
poHticians  now  in  charge  are  in  accord  with 
the  views  expressed  by  these  elements  in  the 
empire,  it  is  but  necessary  to  read  Hertling's 
address  before  the  Reichstag  in  February,  an- 
swering President  Wilson's  peace  principles. 
Hertling  makes  no  mention,  of  course,  of  Ger- 
many's plans,  yet  at  the  same  time  his  speech 
bristles  with  references  to  another  war  in 
which  Germany  must  defend  herself,  and  must 
therefore,  as  a  means  for  defense,  remain  in 
possession  of  this  or  that  part  of  Belgium.  It 
is  all  indicative  of  a  frame  of  mind,  a  mind 
which  for  years  has  been  brought  up  on  war 
and  trained  to  think  in  terms  of  war.  And  all 
the  German  mind  conceives  to-day  is  a  peace 


Germany's  Plans  for  the  Future  Revealed     39 

which  will  enable  the  state  to  wage  most 
efFectively  the  next  war  in  which  it  is  engaged. 
Nothing  is  further  from  German  purpose  or 
German  desire  than  to  make  a  peace  which 
will  stabilize  Europe,  and  lessen  to  a  minimum 
the  chances  of  future  conflict. 


CHAPTER  III 

DESPOLIATION  OF  BELGIUM  SYSTEMATIC  AND 
NOT   WANTON 

German  ambitions  and  the  German  plan  to 
achieve  them  have  been  made  clear  in  many 
ways,  once  the  nucleus  of  the  idea  becomes 
established.  German  writers — commercial,  mili- 
tary and  political — have  been  kind  enough  to 
furnish  us  with  the  premises  from  which  to 
reason.  They  have  established  for  us  the  fact 
that  the  idea  of  another  war  is  in  the  air,  and 
that,  in  so  far  as  the  ruling  classes — politically 
and  financially — are  concerned,  it  is  a  fixed 
idea. 

The  question  that  now  arises  is:  Has  any- 
thing yet  been  done  to  translate  this  idea  into 
facts,  or  has  it  died  aborning,  so  to  speak?  In 
other  words:  Is  there  anything  in  what  Ger- 
many has  actually  done  since  the  war  began  that 
can  be  reasonably  interpreted  as  bearing  out 
the  idea  of  preparation  for  another  great  war.f* 

40 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  41 

In  this  connection  the  sequence  of  events  in 
both  Belgium  and  France  since  1914  is  an 
interesting  study.  The  first  phase  of  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  might  be  termed  the 
period  of  atrocities.  The  crimes  of  the  German 
army,  crimes  which  were  sanctioned  by  the 
highest  German  authorities  and  willingly  com- 
mitted by  the  German  soldiery,  are  generally 
known  and  have  been  amply  testified  to  by 
many  American  authorities  of  unimpeachable 
veracity.  There  can  be  no  doubt  in  the  mind 
of  any  man,  whose  mind  functions  otherwise 
than  in  a  strictly  German  fashion,  that  such 
crimes  were  committed.  The  horrors  of  the 
ravishing  of  Dinant,  of  Termonde,  of  Louvain, 
are  indeed  well  established  and,  to  some  extent 
at  least,  will  always  remain  fresh  in  our  mind. 
These  crimes  held  a  very  specific  object  quite 
in  keeping  with  German  military  policy.  This 
object  was  to  so  instill  in  the  soul  of  the  Belgian 
fear  and  terror  of  Germany  and  of  all  things 
German,  that  there  should  be  no  uprising, 
either  in  mass  or  on  the  part  of  individuals, 
against  the  invaders.  It  is  only  fair  to  acknowl- 
edge, however,  that  the  atrocities  which  were 
committed  were  limited  in  area  to  the  line  of 


42        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

advance  of  the  army.  Arson,  rape,  and  plunder 
were  the  rule  in  this  pathway,  but  outside  of 
it  little  destruction  was  carried  on. 

After  the  first  battle  of  Ypres,  however,  when 
the  war  had  settled  down  into  trenches  and 
the  battle  line  had  been  established  from 
Nieuport  southward,  German  tactics  changed. 
Then  the  German  occupation  was  an  established 
fact;  there  was  small  danger  that,  at  least  for 
some  time  to  come,  it  would  be  interfered  with. 
The  German  problem  in  Belgium  ceased  to  be 
primarily  military  and  became  essentially  one 
of  administration — although  an  administration 
solely  for  German  purposes  and  to  serve  Ger- 
man ends. 

The  problem  having  changed,  the  methods 
also  changed.  The  atrocities  ceased;  and, 
except  in  isolated  cases  such  as  the  murder  of 
Edith  Cavell  and  the  assassination  of  Capt. 
Fryatt,  were  heard  of  no  longer.  Germany,  on 
the  contrary,  set  about  to  reconstitute  the 
Belgian  industries  which,  naturally,  had  sus- 
pended operations,  and  to  restore,  in  so  far  as 
it  was  possible,  the  ante-bellum  commercial 
processes.  It  is  true  that  the  production  of  the 
factories  was  taken  over  by  German  authorities 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  43 

when  it  served  their  ends  to  do  so;  it  is  true 
that  the  agriculture  of  Belgium  was  converted 
to  fill  a  German  need;  galling  restrictions  were 
placed  upon  the  free  movement  of  the  people 
and  the  most  rigid  discipline  was  enforced. 
But  nevertheless,  the  German  rule  was,  accord- 
ing to  German  lights,  decent,  and  generally- 
calculated  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  country 
if  not  of  its  citizens.  Except  for  the  exaction 
of  outrageous  and — if  we  may  still  refer  to 
international  law — illegal  money  indemnities 
and  the  sequestration  of  personal  property 
without  reimbursement,  Germany  made  but 
little  effort  to  interfere  with  the  commercial 
processes  of  the  conquered  state.  The  general 
attitude  was  one  which  they  intended  to  be 
one  of  encouragement. 

This  was  the  second  phase — the  period  of 
semi-peaceful  occupation.  But  this,  too,  was 
all  changed  later  and  there  was  ushered  in  a 
third  phase,  a  period  marked  by  as  systematic 
despoliation  of  all  of  Belgium's  industry,  the 
destruction  of  its  commercial  structure,  the 
social  annihilation  of  its  population.  These 
were  brought  about  by  events  in  the  military 
theater. 


44        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Until  June  191 6  German  military  leaders 
retained  their  belief  in  ultimate  German  victory 
on  all  fronts.  Russia  they  considered  was  out 
of  the  war — if  not  permanently,  at  least  for 
so  long  that  her  revivification  would  be  value- 
less to  the  Entente.  Germany  was  free  there- 
fore, in  the  opinion  of  her  leaders,  to  concen- 
trate on  the  western  front  and  to  pound  her 
way  through  to  victory.  In  such  event,  Belgium 
of  course  would  never  be  restored  to  existence 
as  a  separate  entity,  but  if  it  existed  at  all 
would  either  have  life  only  as  a  German  vassal 
or  be  loosened  from  the  German  grip,  minus 
its  coast  line,  its  strategic  frontier  on  the  Meuse 
and  the  Sambre.  The  Pan-German  party  in- 
deed— decrying  the  1914  statement  of  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  the  German  Chancellor,  that 
the  invasion  was  a  crime  against  international 
law  for  which  compensation  must  be  given 
after  the  war — was  clamoring  for  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  entire  occupied  portion  of  the 
state. 

The  German  view  of  the  Belgian  situation 
was,  then,  that  the  state  would  be  freed, 
stripped  of  its  coal,  its  iron,  and  its  sea  coast. 
This  being  the  German  belief,  there  was  no 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  45 

reason  why  it  should  be  despoiled  by  Germany 
and  every  reason  why  it  should  be  preserved. 

But  in  June  1916  Germany  received  a 
terrific  shock.  Russia  had  come  back  to  her 
own.  The  German  victory  of  the  year  before 
had  not  been  as  complete  or  as  devastating 
as  the  Germans  had  calculated  upon.  Brusiloff's 
great  offensive  had  torn  great  gaps  in  the 
Austrian  lines,  laid  bare  the  flanks,  and  threat- 
ened to  tear  loose  the  German  grip  on  Courland 
and  Poland,  and  throw  all  Teutonic  armies 
back  behind  the  Bug  or  the  Vistula.  Although 
in  the  midst  of  the  great  battle  of  Verdun, 
Germany  had  to  fill  in  these  gaps  in  the  Austrian 
line  to  save  the  situation.  But  hardly  had 
she  made  the  first  move  when  she  was  startled 
by  the  booming  of  the  artillery  fire  which 
opened  the  battle  of  the  Somme  on  the  ist 
of  July.  Although  checked  at  Verdun,  Ger- 
many still  had  faith  in  her  ultimate  success. 
She  still  believed  in  the  indestructible  integrity 
of  her  western  lines. 

She  was  soon  to  be  undeceived.  The  battle 
of  the  Somme  was  hardly  a  month  old,  when 
the  Allied  artillery  had  pounded  into  the  Ger- 
man consciousness  that,  after  all,  there  was  to 


46        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

be  no  German  victory  in  the  west.  On  the 
contrary,  so  completely  were  their  mental  pro- 
cesses inverted  as  a  result  of  the  steady  creep 
forward  of  the  French  and  British  lines,  that 
the  controlHng  thought  was  not  of  victory  but 
of  how  to  avert  defeat.  For  the  first  time 
Germany  realized  that  no  peace  was  probable 
which  did  not  provide  for  an  independent, 
reconstituted  and  indemnified  Belgium. 

The  German  tactics  in  Belgium  were  im- 
mediately changed.  Then  began  the  process 
of  complete  economic  and  social  destruction. 
The  first  concrete  evidence  of  Germany's 
intentions  took  the  form  of  the  deportation  of 
the  men  of  Belgium  into  Germany — the  enslav- 
ing of  the  male  population.  Germany,  of  course, 
wove  the  usual  network  of  lies  in  extenuation 
of  this,  the  grossest  crime  of  the  war,  just  as 
soon  as  the  protests  from  all  civilized  humanity 
began  to  pour  in;  her  claim  being  that  only 
the  idle  were  deported.  This  was  in  a  sense 
true,  but  why  were  there  so  many  idlers,  how 
did  they  become  idle.? 

Baron  Adolph  von  Bachofen,  a  German 
official  who  visited  the  occupied  territory  in 
the  very  early  summer  of  191 6,  wrote  most 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  47 

enthusiastically  of  the  work  of  the  German 
Civil  administration  in  reviving  industrial  and 
agricultural  activity.  As  to  agriculture,  he 
stated  then  that  "the  supply  of  live  stock  is 
now  again  at  its  former  height  and  the  agri- 
cultural output  is  scarcely  less  than  at  any 
time  before  the  conquest." 

Consequently,  previous  to  October  3,  1916, 
the  date  of  the  first  deportation  order,  there 
could  have  been  no  idleness  among  the  agri- 
cultural workers.  In  fact,  because  of  the 
absence  in  the  army  of  so  many  of  those  who 
normally  worked  on  the  farms,  heavy  drafts 
must  have  been  made  on  factory  workers  in 
order  to  keep  up  the  agricultural  output  to 
what  it  was  "before  the  conquest."  Conse- 
quently, the  number  of  factory  workers  who 
might  have  been  idle  was  necessarily  reduced. 
But,  if  we  may  accept  the  word  of  this  German 
official  investigator,  over  70  per  cent,  of  the 
coal  mines  were  in  operation  and  the  percen- 
tage was  constantly  increasing;  practically 
all  of  the  iron  mines  and  steel  works;  the 
pottery  workers;  even  the  diamond  cutters — 
all  these,  together  with  most  of  the  other 
industries,  were   approaching  normal.      There 


48        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

could  have  been  no  great  increase  in  the  number 
of  unemployed  over  that  which  had  existed 
during  the  preceding  two  years.  Moreover, 
we  have  the  evidence  I  have  just  quoted  that 
this  number,  due  to  the  wisdom  of  German 
administration,  was  steadily  decreasing.  There- 
fore if  there  was  an  abnormal  number  of  idle 
Belgian  men,  it  must  have  been  because  the 
Germans  themselves  deliberately  created  such 
a  condition. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  this  is  exactly  what 
happened.  The  German  commanders  stripped 
the  Belgian  factories  of  all  machinery,  threw 
out  of  employment  all  of  the  workers,  and  then 
under  plea  of  idleness  deported  them.  This 
is  well  known  to  any  of  the  Americans  who 
served  with  and  under  Herbert  Hoover  on 
the  Belgian  Relief  Commission,  to  Brand 
Whitlock,  the  American  Ambassador,  to  any 
of  a  hundred  other  Americans  of  estabhshed 
reputation. 

We  can  see  then  why  the  Germans  picked, 
as  the  scenes  for  the  first  raids,  Courtrai,  Alost, 
Termonde,  Bruges,  Ghent,  and  Mons,  as  was 
claimed  in  the  Belgian  Government's  protest 
to  neutral  powers  against  the  forcible  deporta- 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  49 

tion  of  civilians.  Courtrai,  Bruges,  and  Ghent 
were,  before  the  war,  the  centers  of  the  textile 
industry.  Bruges  also  contained  woolen  mills 
and  lace  factories;  Ghent,  many  lead  and  shot 
factories,  gold  and  silver  workers.  Mons  was 
one  of  the  centers  of  metal  working.  Thus 
there  is  seen  to  be  a  close  relation  between 
Belgian  industry  and  the  points  selected  from 
which  to  steal  and  deport  Belgian  men. 

Now  let  us  see  what  happened  to  this  industry 
as  admitted  by  Germany  and  as  charged  by 
the  Belgian  Government.  The  note  from  the 
latter  on  this  subject  cites  the  following  passages 
from  a  semi-official  note  that  appeared  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allegemeine  Zeitung,  No.  392,  of 
December  18,  1917,  in  which  we  find  an  admis- 
sion of  the  truth  of  the  statements  made  in 
regard  to  dismantling  the  German  factories. 

"All  measures  taken  in  Belgium  are  inspired 
by  military  necessity. 

"The  exploitation,  under  military  control,  of 
Belgian  factories  in  order  to  repair  locomotives 
and  automobiles,  and  also  to  obtain  material  of 
war  for  the  front,  is  carried  out  for  the  purpose  of 
relieving  the  strain  on  German  industry  and  econ- 
omizing transportation.  It  has  become  necessary 
to  strip  the  Belgian   factories  of  their  machinery 


50        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

and  other  fittings,  because  all  German  industry 
is  busy  filling  orders  for  material  of  war.  .  .  . 
By  relieving  the  home  market  from  the  necessity 
of  enlarging  our  own  factories  we  are  accelerating 
the  production  of  munitions  and  other  products. 
...  In  consequence  of  the  intense  activity  of  all 
German  industry,  our  machinery  and  other  equip- 
ment is  tremendously  overworked,  and  must  from 
time  to  time  be  partly  replaced  by  new  machines, 
while,  furthermore,  we  must  be  able  to  furnish 
spare  parts  rapidly  unless  we  wish  to  see  our  output 
of  munitions  diminish.  The  machinery  and  equip- 
ment required  for  these  purposes  are  evidently 
brought  from  Belgian  factories.  The  destruction 
of  whole  factories  for  the  production  of  grapeshot 
is  effected  in  order  to  maintain  at  its  present  level 
the  supply  of  iron  and  steel  in  Germany  or,  if 
possible,  to  raise  it.  .  .  .  It  is  not  only  possible, 
but  even  evident,  that,  in  view  of  all  the  steps  taken 
by  the  military  authorities,  the  question  of  keeping 
up  work  in  some  of  the  factories  of  the  occupied 
country  must  be  subordinated  to  considerations 
tending  to  spare  the  lives  of  German  soldiers  and 
thus   protect   our   national   power." 

In  latter  days,  Germany  did  not  go  through 
the  formality  of  stripping  the  factories  first 
and  then  of  deporting  the  men  thus  thrown 
idle.  In  many  cases  she  has  deported  the  men 
first,   as   a   means   of  destroying  the   Belgian 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  51 

commercial  system,  and  then,  as  the  factories 
were  idle,  Belgium  of  course  had  no  use  for 
them,  so  they  were  either  stripped  or  turned 
over  to  German  interests. 

On  this  general  subject,  there  was  received 
in  the  United  States  in  the  middle  of  February 
191 8,  an  official  Belgian  document  from  which 
the  following  extracts  are  taken. 

First  we  see  the  working  of  the  usual  German 
method — a  plea  first  in  denial,  then  of  justifi- 
cation and  excuse.  The  Belgian  note  first 
quotes  from  the  Nieuzue  Rotterdamsche  Courant 
of  December  27,  1917,  the  following  telegram, 
dated  Berhn,  the  same  day: 

"Reuter  is  sending  out  the  assertion  that  the 
Germans  are  pillaging  and  demolishing  the  Belgian 
factories  in  order  to  hamper  Belgian  commerce 
after  the  war.  On  the  contrary,  Germany  has 
already,  merely  in  her  own  interest,  done  every- 
thing she  could  to  restore  to  life  the  paralyzed 
industry  of  Belgium.  If  she  has  only  partly  suc- 
ceeded, the  blame  rests  entirely  on  England,  which 
has  obstinately  opposed  every  arrangement  to 
supply  the  Belgian  factories  with  raw  material." 

To  read  such  a  statement  in  connection  with 
that  from  the  Norddeutsche  Allegemeine  Zeitung 


52        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

of  December  i8th,  issued  only  ten  days  before, 
and  which  I  have  previously  quoted,  not  only  fills 
one  with  contempt  but  with  a  feeling  of  pity 
for  a  nation  which  has  sunk  so  low  that  it 
must  defend  its  every  act  with  a  fabrication  of 
lies  which  are  so  numerous  and  so  frequent  that 
they  do  not  possess  even  the  merit  of  con- 
sistency. 

To  this  statement  the  Belgian  Government 
has  issued  a  reply  the  essence  of  which  is  true 
and  which  the  Americans,  whose  names  I 
have  mentioned  and  who  have  had  every  means 
of  ascertaining  the  truth  on  the  ground,  have 
already  pubHcly  stated  to  be  the  facts. 

"Germany  is  trying  in  vain  to  throw  upon  others 
the  responsibility  for  the  ruin  of  Belgian  industry. 
She  is  condemned  by  the  facts  and  by  her  own 
admissions. 

"Germany  is  the  immediate  author  of  the  cessa- 
tion of  industry  in  Belgium.  In  1914  and  1915  she 
seized  all  the  existing  stock  of  raw  material. 

"It  is  strictly  her  fault  that  the  importation  of 
raw  material  could  not  be  arranged  for.  In  August 
and  September  1915  there  was  submitted  to  the 
British  Government,  and  accepted  by  it,  a  plan 
for  organizing  the  supply  of  raw  material  to  the 
industries   of   Belgium,    under   international   guar- 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  53 

antees  analogous  to  those  which  protect  the  supply 
of  food.  To  save  the  industries  of  Belgium  it  re- 
mained only  to  obtain  Germany's  consent.  But 
she  turned  a  deaf  ear,  and  the  project  naturally 
had  no  result.  The  British  Government,  in  a  letter 
published  through  the  newspapers,  officially  declared 
Germany  responsible.'* 

The  Belgian  report  then  goes  on  to  relate  the 
various  steps  Germany  has  taken  to  cripple 
Belgian  industries. 

"The  German  authorities  then  aggravated  the 
evils  of  industrial  stoppage  by  forbidding  public 
works  and  commandeering  the  factories  and  metals 
and  leather  for  military  purposes.  After  this  they 
instituted  the  barbarous  system  of  deporting  work- 
men to  perform  forced  labor  in  Germany,  a  system 
which  they  had  to  interrupt  officially,  after  some 
months,  because  it  proved  revolting  to  the  con- 
science of  mankind,  but  only  to  substitute  for  it 
immediately  the  forced  labor  of  the  civilian  popu- 
lation, in  work  of  military  value,  by  order  of 
the  military  authorities.  This  system  is  still 
being  cruelly  maintained  in  the  zones  lying  back 
of  the  fighting  line  in  the  provinces  of  East  and 
West  Flanders,  Hainaut,  Namur,   and  Luxemburg. 

"Meanwhile,  the  commandeering  has  become 
general,  and  affects  both  natural  and  manufactured 
products  and  also  tools,  motors,  and  means  of 
transportation,     whether    mechanical    or    animal. 


\ 


54        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Finally,  fiscal  and  administrative  measures  have 
been  taken  to  close  the  last  remaining  outlets  for 
Belgian  products  into  neutral  countries. 

"These  facts  are  incontestable.  They  are  proved 
by  many  rules  and  regulations  officially  published 
by  the  German  authorities." 

Referring  specifically  to  the  stripping  of  the 
Belgian  factories  of  machinery,  and  the  trans- 
portation of  this  machinery  into  Germany, 
this  official  note  states: 

"At  present  the  raid  upon  the  last  economic 
resources  of  occupied  Belgium  has  been  carried  on 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  are  methodically  taking 
away  all  the  machinery  from  the  factories,  which 
they  themselves  have  made  idle,  in  some  cases  to 
set  it  up  again  in  Germany,  in  other  cases  to  break 
it  up  and  use  it  for  grapeshot. 

"The  purpose  of  this  entire  system  of  destruction 
is  double:  First,  to  supply  deficiencies  in  German 
industry;  second,  to  put  an  end  to  Belgian  com- 
petition and  later  to  subject  Belgian  industry  to 
that  of  German  when  the  time  comes  for  refitting 
the  factories  with  machinery  after  the  war. 

"The  proofs  collected  by  the  Belgian  Government 
in  support  of  this  statement  are  conclusive. 

"It  is  significant  that  in  general  the  task  of 
systematically  stripping  Belgian  factories  was  en- 
trusted to  German  manufacturers,  who   were    the 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  55 

direct  competitors  of  the  Belgian  owners.  Some 
of  them  have  taken  advantage  of  their  official 
positions  to  steal  secrets  of  manufacturing  pro- 
cesses— for  example,  at  the  artificial  silk  shops  of 
Obourg — and  personal  methods  of  production  and 
sale. 

"Moreover,  some  of  these  authorized  pillagers 
have  let  fall  admissions,  which  have  been  repro- 
duced in  the  German  press  and  which  leave  no 
room  for  doubt.  These  admissions  are  strung  along 
throughout  the  years  1915  to  1917;  they  agree 
with  one  another,  and  have  become  more  and  more 
precise  as  the  war  has  gone  on." 

This  question  of  the  destruction  of  Belgian 
industries,  particularly  since  the  early  fall  of 
1916,  has  been  dealt  with  at  considerable 
length  because  it  is  one  of  the  most  important 
elements  of  the  German  scheme.  It  emphasizes 
the  transition  from  the  second  to  the  third 
phase  of  the  Belgian  occupation,  and  the 
change  of  the  German  attitude  toward  Belgium 
incident  to  that  transition.  As  long  as  Ger- 
many thought  that  she  was  to  remain  in  pos- 
session of  Belgium,  her  poHcy  was  generally 
constructive;  when,  however,  she  realized  that 
her  scheme  was  to  be  frustrated,  she  dehberately 
set   out   to   obliterate    Belgium   from    Europe. 


56        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

The  net  results  which  have  been  accomplished 
through  this  process  are: 

First:  the  impoverishing  of  the  country 
through  outrageous  levies  of  money. 

Second:  the  economic  ruin  brought  about 
through  stripping  all  factories  of  their  ma- 
chinery. 

Third :  the  social  and  commercial  destruction 
produced  through  the  deportation  of  the  able- 
bodied  male  element  in  the  population. 

In  brief,  Belgium  is  but  a  shell.  Its  factories 
are  but  walls;  its  population  composed  for  the 
most  part  only  of  women,  children,  and  old 
men;  its  past  commercial  structure  in  ruins. 
Economic  dependence  is  absolute  and  it  is 
the  German  intention  that  it  remain  so. 

Before  linking  up  this  outline  of  the  German 
processes  in  Belgium  with  the  German  plan 
for  a  future  war,  we  may  first  examine  the 
situation  in  northeastern  France  and  compare 
the  German  actions  here  with  those  in  Belgium. 
In  the  early  days  of  the  German  invasion  of 
France  there  was  an  apparent  regard  for  the 
laws  of  war,  and  no  organized  destruction. 
Indeed,  for  the  short  period  during  which  the 
Germans    occupied    Rheims,    they    paid    the 


Despoliation  of  Belgium 


57 


French  in  gold,  and  at  a  very  good  price,  for 
all  the  wine  they  drank. 

But  this  period  was  short.    Once  the  battle 
lines  became  established,  occupied  France  was 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  BELGIUM 

The  areas  in  which  the  Germans  have  destroyed  cities  and  towns 
in  this  thickly  populated  industrial  country.  Everywhere  they 
have  stripped  industry  of  its  machinery  and  deported  labor  in  an 
effort  to  keep  Belgium  from  becoming  an  economic  competitor 
after  the  war.  The  size  of  the  dots  on  the  map  indicates  the  num- 
ber of  buildings  destroyed.  The  largest  (Ypres),  3700  buildings 
destroyed;  the  smallest  (Poulseur),  25  (or  less)  buildings  destroyed 

governed  very  much  as  was  Belgium  in  the 
second  phase  of  occupation.  But  again  the 
battle  of  the  Somme  intervened  and  Germany 
learned  that  she  was  not  to  be  permitted  to 


58        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

hold  in  the  west  any  of  the  gains  she  had  so 
foully  acquired.  Threatened,  as  a  result  of 
the  Somme  fighting,  with  serious  disaster,  she 
prepared  for  retreat  to  a  new  line. 

The  wave  of  horror  which  swept  over  the 
world  when  the  nature  of  this  retreat  became 
known,  will  keep  its  memory  alive  at  least 
until  those  who  read  of  it  have  gone.  The 
whole  countryside  was  literally  leveled  to  the 
ground.  Orchards  were  destroyed,  every  tree 
sawed  off  close  to  the  roots,  every  farmhouse 
with  its  outbuildings  burned,  every  garden  and 
every  bush  uprooted.  Every  work  of  art  and  of 
architecture  was  leveled,  all  Nature  was  sys- 
tematically ravished  until  all  that  remained 
of  a  populous  thriving  country  were  the  earth 
and  the  sky. 

The  tearing  up  of  earth  roads,  the  dynamit- 
ing of  bridges  and  railroads,  these  are  all  cal- 
culated to  delay  an  advancing  army  and, 
consequently,  are  reasonable,  if  regrettable, 
precautions  for  an  army  in  retreat  to  take. 
But  for  that  orgy  of  rapacious,  vicious  devas- 
tation there  seemed  no  logical  reason  or  excuse. 
The  popular  idea  at  the  time  was  that  all  this 
was   but   the  outcropping  of  the  same  spirit 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  59 

that  manifested  itself  in  Belgium;  that  it  was 
but  evidence  of  an  innate  lust  for  destruction, 
of  a  pure  vandalistic  tendency. 

This  might  hold  true  were  the  acts  but  the 
acts  of  individuals.  But  they  were  not.  The 
whole  idea  was  carried  out  in  the  prosecution 
of  a  carefully  considered,  thoroughly  organized, 
plan.  It  was  dictated  neither  by  an  instinct 
for  destruction  nor  through  impulse.  Germany 
does  not  work  that  way.  She  is  cunning, 
shrewdly  calculating,  materialistic.  Her  leaders 
could  not  but  realize  that  these  acts  of  rapacity 
— more  like  the  venting  of  rage  of  some  savage 
beast  than  like  the  acts  of  a  civilized,  organized, 
state — were  calculated  to  arouse  among  her 
enemies  a  feeling  of  bitter  resentment  and 
hatred  that  would  completely  close  the  door 
to  a  generous  peace  in  case  of  a  defeat;  and 
defeat,  be  it  noted,  actually  threatened.  To 
assume  that  such  deeds  were  done  wantonly, 
without  thought  and  without  motive,  is  to 
charge  Germany  with  a  thoughtlessness,  a 
carelessness,  entirely  at  variance  with  our 
knowledge  of  her  character.  There  must  there- 
fore have  been  a  clearly  defined  and  well  under- 
stood motive. 


6o        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Since,  as  has  been  proven,  Germany  has  for 
generations  been  casting  a  covetous  eye  west- 
ward and  has  expressed  the  desire  if  not  the  in- 
tention ultimately  to  annex  the  most  important 
territoryof  her  western  neighbors,  let  us  assume 
that  she,  realizing  that  in  this  war  she  was 
doomed  to  defeat  in  the  west,  had  in  mind  the 
launching  of  another  war  later,  in  order  to 
reahze  the  ambitions  still  ungratified  in  this 
quarter.  With  this  assumption  as  a  basis,  then, 
let  us  see  how  it  fits  in  with  the  situation  which 
Germany  has  created  in  France  and  Belgium. 

Germany,  at  the  beginning  of  such  a  war, 
will  be  confronted  with  the  same  military 
problem  which  confronted  her  in  1914.  From 
Luxemburg  to  the  Swiss  frontier  she  will  be 
faced  first  with  the  fortified  area  of  Verdun, 
guarded  from  an  eastern  attack  by  the  Heights 
of  the  Woevre;  by  the  barrier  of  the  Moselle 
with  Nancy  as  the  defensive  center,  and  finally 
with  the  Vosges  Mountains,  passage  of  which 
can  be  forced  only  through  the  gaps  at  Epinal 
and  Belfort,  the  western  exits  of  which  are 
thoroughly  guarded.  It  is  an  easy  line  to 
defend,  a  most  difficult  one  to  attack. 

Would  Germany  strike  here,  submitting  to 


Despoliation  of  Belgium  6i 

an  indefinite  delay,  or  would  she  come  down 
from  the  northeast,  ignoring  again  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  in  order  to  strike  France 
along  an  unprotected  frontier?  With  the 
accumulated  knowledge  of  the  last  three  years, 
an  answer  is  superfluous.  Having  flaunted  the 
opinion  of  the  civilized  world  in  19 14  we  may 
be  certain  she  would  do  the  same  thing  again 
should  it  serve  her  interests.  No  thinking 
man,  then,  will  take  issue  with  the  assertion 
that,  should  Germany  strike  again  at  France, 
her  army  will  advance  along  the  line  of  least 
resistance,  no  matter  what  violations  of  neutral 
territory  may  be  involved  in  the  process. 

Striking  down  through  Belgium,  what  opposi- 
tion would  she  meet  between  the  German 
frontier  and  Paris?  It  has  been  shown  how 
thoroughly  Belgium  has  been  destroyed.  It 
was  the  German  plan  to  have  it  done  so  as  to 
defy  any  immediate  reconstruction.  Every 
district,  every  factory  in  that  district,  with 
its  machinery  equipment,  must  be  built  up 
anew.  Moreover,  Belgium  would  not  have  the 
man  power  to  hold  in  check  even  a  fragment 
of  the  German  army.  With  northeastern 
France,  the  situation  would  be  the  same.    Of 


62        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

all  this  great  industrial  region,  there  would  not 
remain  a  vestige  nor  an  obstacle.  All  would 
be  leveled,  coal  and  iron  mines  destroyed, 
farms  ruined,  commercial  structures  blasted. 
It  would  take  France  indeed  just  as  long  to 
recover  as  it  will  Belgium.  In  much  less  time 
would  Germany  be  ready,  and  with  Belgium 
no  longer  a  thorn  in  her  side,  and  with  the 
northeastern  gateway  to  France  wide  open, 
the  German  hordes  could  march,  without 
effective  opposition,  to  Paris  and  Calais. 

It  is  a  repetition  of  an  old  German  idea. 
Julius  Caesar  wrote  of  the  German  tribes  as 
follows : 

"The  tribes  deem  it  an  honorable  distinction  to 
have  their  frontiers  devastated,  to  be  surrounded 
with  immense  deserts.  They  regard  it  as  the  highest 
proof  of  valor  for  their  neighbors  to  abandon  their 
territories  out  of  fear  of  them;  moreover,  they  have 
thus  an  additional  security  against  sudden  attack." 


CHAPTER  IV 

CALAIS-BAGDAD    NOT   HAMBURG-BAGDAD 
THE    GERMAN    AIM 

When  General  Moritz  von  Bissing  died  he 
left  among  his  papers  an  extraordinary  docu- 
ment which  bears  out  most  positively  the 
conclusions  reached  in  the  previous  chapter. 
General  von  Bissing  was  the  Governor-General 
of  conquered  Belgium  from  191 5  to  1917,  so 
that  this  document  has  a  peculiar  interest  in 
connection  with  Germany's  future  plans. 

After  discussing  the  present  war  in  a  general 
way,  he  states:. 

"I  shall  now  indicate  the  strategic  importance 
of  Belgium  for  a  future  war.  In  order  to  be  able 
to  conduct  the  present  war  offensively  at  all,  the 
German  Supreme  Command  was  forced  to  march 
through  Belgium,  and  in  this  process  the  right  wing 
of  the  German  army  had  to  push  itself  laboriously 
along  the  edge  of  the  Dutch  province  of  Limburg. 
Strategically,  the  objective  of  the  present  war,  as 
regards  the  western  theater,  should  consist  in  our 

63 


64        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

obtaining  elbow  room,  in  order  that  in  any  new 
war  whatever  we  should  be  able  to  operate  with 
our  army  against  France  and  England.  If  the 
result  of  the  present  war  were  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  an  independent  Belgian  State,  the  operations 
would  have  to  be  conducted  differently  and  under 
greater  difficulties  than  at  the  beginning  of  the 
present  war;  for  the  aim  of  France  and  England 
will  be,  in  conjunction  with  an  allied  or  strongly 
influenced  Belgium,  to  anticipate  the  German 
army.  It  will,  therefore,  rightly  be  asked  whether 
in  such  circumstances  it  can  be  possible  to  guarantee 
the  freedom  of  operations  of  the  German  right 
wing,  and  whether  the  advance  of  these  groups 
of  armies  to  conduct  a  new  war  offensively  is 
possible." 

There  is  in  this  quotation  first  a  direct 
reference  to  another  war,  showing  the  trend 
of  German  thought  even  in  the  midst  of  the 
present  horrors.  A  little  later  he  indicates  that 
this  projected  war  is  to  be  against  England  and 
France,  proving  that  there  is  at  least  the  fear 
that  in  the  present  war  these  nations  cannot 
be  worsted.  Finally,  there  is  the  strategic 
relation  of  Belgium  to  this  future  war  which 
makes  it  necessary  for  the  success  of  German 
arms  that  Belgium  be  removed  as  a  possible 
enemy  by  the  simple  process  of  annexation. 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     65 

Somewhat  later  he  discusses  the  value  of 
industrial  Belgium  to  Germany,  and,  it  will 
be  noted,  candidly  admits  the  removal  of 
Belgian  machinery  to  Germany. 

"The  advantages  which  we  have  been  able 
during  the  present  war  to  obtain  from  Belgian 
industry  by  the  removal  of  machinery  and  so  on, 
are  as  important  as  the  disadvantages  which  our 
enemies  have  suffered  through  lack  of  this  addition 
to  their  fighting  strength. 

"When  one  considers  the  importance  of  Belgium 
as  the  theater  of  our  armies'  advance  and  as  terri- 
tory which  favors  our  further  operations,  both 
offensively  and  defensively,  there  can  be  no  further 
doubt  that  a  frontier  which  is  quite  falsely  de- 
scribed as  the  line  of  the  Meuse  and  is  to  be  pro- 
tected by  the  fortresses  of  Liege  and  Namur,  is 
inadequate.  No,  our  frontier — in  the  interest  also  of 
our  sea  power — must  be  pushed  forward  to  the  sea. 
.  .  .  The  annual  Belgian  production  of  23,000,000 
tons  of  coal  has  given  us  a  monopoly  on  the  continent 
which  has  helped  to  maintain  our  vitality.  In 
addition  to  these  factors  which  are  of  importance 
in  a  new  war,  the  protection  of  our  economic  inter- 
ests in  Belgium,  even  in  time  of  peace,  is  of  inestima- 
ble importance." 

This  statement  is  remarkable  for  the  com- 
plete lack  of  moral  sense  exhibited.  There  is  not 


66        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

a  thought  given  to  any  rights  that  Belgium 
may  have;  it  is  the  doctrine  of  the  righteous- 
ness of  brute  force.  Anything  which  will  add 
to  German  strength,  Germany  is  free  to  take, 
no  matter  to  whom  it  may  happen  to  belong. 
As  regards  the  extension  of  German  colonial 
possessions,  we  find  a  most  ambitious  program. 

"The  Belgian  Congo  is  certainly  to  be  aimed  at, 
and  I  desire  to  insist  that  a  German  colonial  empire, 
whatever  its  shape,  is  indispensable  for  Germany's 
world  policy  and  expansion  of  power." 

It  is  not  known  exactly  when  this  "political 
testament"  was  penned,  but  it  was  either  in 
the  latter  part  of  191 5  or  in  the  early  months  of 
1916,  before  the  Russian  offensive  in  June  or 
the  battle  of  the  Somme  in  July.  In  fact  this 
document  contains  a  reference  to  "a  peace 
concluded  in  1916"  showing  that  this  is  the 
case.  Therefore,  while  Von  Bissing  realized 
the  possibility  of  defeat,  the  possibility  was  so 
remote  that  he  did  not  give  it  serious  thought. 
The  entire  document  emphasizes  the  impor- 
tance of  Belgium  to  Germany  as  a  ground  on 
which  to  prepare  for  another  crushing  blow 
at  England   and   France.      Had  Von   Bissing, 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad    (if 

holding  the  views  that  have  been  quoted, 
written  six  months  later,  would  he  not  have 
advocated  just  such  a  policy  as  that  which  has 
been  carried  out  in  both  Belg'um  and  France, 
so  that  in  the  next  war  they  may  be  able  to 
interpose  no  obstacles  between  the  German 
army  and  the  French  coast?  Would  he  not, 
in  defeat,  have  prepared  the  way  for  a  subse- 
quent victory? 

Several  objections  may  be  raised  to  the 
theory  that  Germany  is  thinking  of  another 
war.  The  first  is  that  of  money.  In  the  first 
place,  money  is  not  essential  to  war.  As  long 
as  a  nation  is  self-supporting  and  is  not  com- 
pelled to  go  out  into  neutral  markets  for  raw 
materials,  foreign  credit  is  not  necessary.  All 
that  is  needed,  as  Germany  has  proven,  is  a 
printing  press  and  the  power  to  assert  that  the 
products  of  that  press  shall  be  the  medium  of 
exchange  and  a  hope  of  victory.  If  victory 
is  achieved,  its  fruits  will  solve  the  question  of 
foreign  credit. 

But  aside  from  her  credit  in  foreign  countries 
Germany  is  wealthier  to-day  by  billions  than 
she  was  when  the  war  began.  She  has  robbed 
and  looted  and  pillaged  wherever  she  has  set 


68        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

foot;  through  Belgian  and  French  coal  and 
iron  she  has  waged  war  at  not  more  than  50 
per  cent,  of  the  cost  to  the  Allies  who  must 
transport  their  supply  of  these  essentials  three 
thousand  miles  overseas;  she  has  annexed 
thousands  of  square  miles  of  new  and  produc- 
tive territory  and  is  rapidly  exploiting  it  with 
enslaved  labor  to  which  she  pays  practically 
nothing  in  wages.  If  allowed  to  hold  her 
Eastern  accessions,  she  could  give  up  all  of 
France  and  Belgium,  pay  them  both  sub- 
stantial indemnities,  and  still  find  the  war  the 
most  profitable  enterprise  of  that  sort  she  has 
ever  provoked. 

But  Germany  has  also  been  making  money 
in  other  ways — profiteering  at  the  expense  of 
her  Allies.  Neither  Austria,  Bulgaria,  nor 
Turkey  contains  coal  or  iron  in  any  material 
quantities — certainly  not  in  sufficient  quanti- 
ties to  supply  the  demand.  While  it  is  true 
that  none  of  the  three  has  been  forced  to  use 
artillery  on  a  scale  even  approximating  that 
of  Germany,  Austria  has  still  had  to  supply  a 
great  demand  on  account  of  the  battles  against 
Russia  and  Italy;  Bulgaria  because  of  the 
fighting  first   against  Serbia   and   now  on  the 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     69 

Saloniki  front,  Turkey  because  of  the  fighting 
in  Armenia,  Mesopotamia,  and  Palestine.  Prac- 
tically all  of  the  raw  material  consumed  in 
these  areas  was  purchased  from  Germany, 
and,  we  may  depend  upon  it,  at  an  exorbitant 
price;  and  where  did  Germany  get  it? 

Germany  stole  it — coal  and  iron  from  Bel- 
gium, coal  and  iron  from  France,  iron  from 
Longwy  and  Briey,  coal  from  Lens.  The 
mining  was  done  by  forced  labor  from  Belgium 
and  France,  prisoners  from  Russia.  The  cost 
to  Germany  was  practically  nothing.  How 
many  hundreds  of  millions  were  obtained  in 
this  manner  only  Germany  knows — more,  cer- 
tainly, than  could  be  paid  for  except  through 
loans — through  bonds.  Germany,  therefore, 
has  an  economic  grip  on  her  allies  which  only 
defeat  can  break — a  grip  which  has  throttled 
them  into  abject  bondage. 

Germany  too,  it  must  be  remembered,  has  not 
yet  been  touched  by  the  war.  Only  in  East 
Prussia,  which  is  almost  entirely  agricultural, 
has  the  war  reached  German  soil.  Westphalia, 
Rhineland,  Saar,  the  great  industrial  districts 
of  western  Germany,  are  more  keenly  alive 
commercially  than  in   1914.      With  her  own 


yo        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

wealth  but  slightly  dissipated  and  with  this 
dissipation  more  than  counterbalanced  by  in- 
creased assets  obtained  through  conquest,  with 
her  industries  all  working  at  the  very  top  of 
their  stride,  Germany's  recovery  will  be  most 
rapid.  Certainly,  unless  some  measures  are 
taken  to  prevent  it,  she  can  be  ready  again  for 
war  very  rapidly. 

A  final  objection  to  this  idea  of  a  future 
war  rests  on  the  question  of  man  power. 
Germany  has  lost  heavily  in  men;  will  continue 
to  lose  heavily  during  the  rest  of  the  war.  Her 
loss  in  killed  alone  will,  before  the  day  of  peace, 
fall  but  little  short  of  two  million  men.  For 
such  a  war  as  Germany  is  planning,  her  mili- 
tary force  must  possess  overwhelming  numbers 
in  order  to  carry  the  plan  through  in  permissible 
time.  Where  will  Germany,  who  has  suffered 
so  heavily  in  loss  of  man  power,  obtain  suf- 
ficient men  to  insure  victory  in  the  new  battle 
of  Europe.'' 

This  question,  too,  Germany  has  carefully 
considered.  Indeed  it  was  the  most  pressing 
element  which  led  to  the  subjection  by  Ger- 
many of  her  allies  to  the  degree  of  vassalage 
they  are  now  suffering  from.   Germany  wanted 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     71 

control  of  their  man  power  as  well  as  of  tlieir 
resources  and  their  trade  routes.  She  cannot  be 
refused  now  that  she  holds  in  her  hands  their 
economic  fate.  The  relation  of  Turkey  to 
Germany  is  notorious.  The  Turks  are  a  con- 
quered people — conquered  in  soul  and  in  body 
by  the  tyranny  of  the  Kaiser.  They  have  no 
independence  of  plan  or  of  thought.  They  are 
slaves.  In  Turkey  there  is  a  population  of 
about  twenty  million — undisciplined,  unorgan- 
ized, unequipped — but  innately  possessed  of 
good  fighting  ability.  From  this  force  Ger- 
many can,  in  one  generation,  produce  a  trained, 
organized  army  of  at  least  two  million  men. 
To  this  number  Bulgaria  will  add  half  a  milHon 
more,  bringing  the  number  of  German-trained 
soldiers  East  of  Serbia  to  two  and  a  half  million. 
But  these  forces  must  be  brought  into  play 
west  of  Belgrade,  and  to  effect  this  Germany 
must  control  the  Oriental  Railroad.  This 
will  explain  Germany's  actions  in  Serbia. 
Serbia  is  the  bridge  which  spans  the  gap 
between  Germany  and  her  Near  Eastern  allies. 
Through  Serbia  and  Serbia  alone  can  the  Ger- 
man dream  of  a  Hamburg-Bagdad  railroad 
become  a  reality.    If  peace  were  declared  and 


72        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

there  were  decreed  a  reconstruction  of  the 
Serbian  state,  there  would  always  exist  a 
constant  threat  against  that  all-important  link 
between  Belgrade  and  Nish.  Germany  can 
reap  the  maximum  benefits  from  the  Oriental 
Railroad  only  through  holding  in  a  tutelage 
which  approaches  bondage  all  of  the  lands 
through  which  that  railroad  passes.  Only  by 
this  means  can  Germany  develop  the  full 
resources  of  the  Near  East,  organize  the  Turk- 
ish population  into  an  effective  military  force, 
and  mobilize  it  in  Europe  for  a  war  against 
England  and  France. 

Since  Germany  cannot  unite  the  Serbs  to 
herself  by  treaty,  and  since  it  was  necessary 
to  get  Serbia  out  of  the  way,  Germany  delib- 
erately planned  to  reduce  her  to  a  state  of 
complete  innocuousness  from  which  she  could 
not  recover  in  a  half  century,  if  ever.  We 
therefore  witnessed  in  the  fall  and  winter  of 
191 5,  the  complete  immolation  of  Serbia  on  the 
altar  of  German  ambition.  Of  the  four  and  a 
half  million  of  people,  about  one  and  a  half 
are  dead,  one  million  are  in  exile  or  in  the 
army,  the  others  deported  into  Austria  and 
Bulgaria  and  undergoing  a  system  of  unscru- 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     73 


pulous  annihilation.  The  country  itself  has 
been  turned  into  a  desert  waste;  women  have 
been  deliberately  left  to  starve  and  freeze  in 


Lemberg' 


Berlin" 

GERMANY 

^  yieinrichsgruiT''^     •— . 

(D   3m\®AUSTRIA. 

V A^ . .*.  N,  V>  ^  Vienna 

ERLAND^.'» 


RUSSIA 


GEOGRAPHY  OF  SERBIAN  EXILE 

The  distances  that  Serbian  exiles  are  sent  preclude  the  possibility 
of  their  easy  return  after  the  war 

the  mountains  with  their  babies  on  their 
breasts.  Children  on  whose  small  shoulders 
rests  the  future  strength  of  the  state,  have 
been  viciously,  deliberately  murdered.  Not  one 
generation  must  pass  but  probably  two,  before 
Serbia  can  rise  from  the   ashes;    but   by  that 


74        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

time,  in  the  German  plan,  it  will  be  too  late; 
the  Oriental  road  will  have  been  open  long 
enough  to  have  permitted  the  Turks  and 
Bulgars  to  fight  in  France,  the  next  war  will 
have  been  fought  and  won. 

We  therefore  have,  so  far,  an  open  route 
by  which  three  and  a  quarter  milHon  of  German 
slaves  can  enter  Western  Europe.  In  Greece 
of  course,  due  to  ties  of  kinship  and  autocracy 
between  the  rulers,  there  is  already  a  strong 
pro-German  party,  which,  should  Germany 
obtain  a  Teutonic  peace,  will  seize  the  reins 
and  again  turn  Greece  over  to  the  Kaiser. 
Thus  another  half  miUion  soldiers  are  added 
to  the  army  of  German  minions.  Of  Rumania, 
Germany  is  frankly  dubious.  King  Ferdinand 
has  spoiled  her  plans  more  than  once,  and  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  he  is  a  Hohenzollern, 
bends  distinctly  to  the  racial  tie  which  binds  the 
Rumanian  people  to  the  other  races  using  the 
Romance  languages.  Therefore,  in  order  to  place 
this  state  also  within  his  grasp,  it  is  ordained 
that,  in  return  for  peace,  the  Rumanians  must 
force  Ferdinand  to  abdicate  in  favor  of  his 
brother.  But  who  is  this  brother?  Prince 
William  of  Hohenzollern,  a  General  of  Prussian 


Calais- Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     75 

infantry.  Thus  we  have  the  Balkan  chain 
complete,  with  every  link  of  it  perfectly  welded 
on  a  German  anvil  to  the  German  throne. 
Of  Austria  little  need  be  added  to  what  has 
already  been  said.  As  things  are  now,  she  is 
a  slave,  dominated  in  every  way  by  her  Teu- 
tonic master.  Her  fifty-two  million  population 
is  Germany's  to  do  with  as  Germany  elects. 
There  is  no  voice  in  the  empire  powerful  enough 
to  combat  the  German  Kaiser's. 

Now,  let  us  turn  westward,  and  look  into 
the  measures  which  Germany  has  adopted  for 
herself  to  close  the  gaps  which  the  war  has  torn 
in  her  man  power.  The  German  plans  to  in- 
crease her  man  power  have  taken  several  forms. 

First,  there  was  the  authorized  and  syste- 
matic ravishing  of  the  women  of  France  and 
Belgium  and  the  sending  of  the  offspring  from 
this  official  and  bestial  debauchery  into  Ger- 
many, to  be  reared  in  German  institutions — 
to  form  a  part  of  the  future  defense.  Of  this 
fact  there  is  no  longer  any  doubt.  It  has  been 
definitely  and  clearly  established  by  unim- 
peachable neutral  testimony. 

The  deportation  of  the  men  of  Belgium  is 
another   phase.      These   men   will,   of  course, 


76        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

never  return  to  their  homes  if  Germany  can 
prevent  it,  and  so  in  themselves  will  constitute 
an  effective  increase  in  the  male  population. 
But  they  will  do  more  than  this.  Either  vol- 
untarily or  through  compulsion,  they  will 
form  some  sort  of  liaison,  legitimate  or  other- 
wise, with  the  surplus  women  of  Germany  and 
will  beget  offspring  which  in  twenty  years  will 
be  available  food  for  powder.  As  the  excess  of 
Germany's  female  population  in  1914  was 
800,000  and  is  now  three  times  that  number, 
this  will  prove  a  ready  means  of  taking  care 
of  some  of  the  surplus. 

Another  means  of  providing  for  a  new  and 
increased  population  is  what  is  termed  the 
lateral  marriages.  There  are  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  young  women  in  Germany,  capable 
of  bearing  children,  who  are  at  present  not  so 
engaged  either  because  unmarried  or  because  of 
the  absence  of  their  husbands  at  the  front.  To 
German  efficiency  this  is  a  waste  of  human 
material.  God  would  not  have  endowed  woman 
with  this  important  function  were  it  not  in- 
tended that  it  should  be  used  as  frequently  as 
the  laws  of  nature  permit.  And  to  what  better 
use  could  it  be  put  than  for  the  Fatherland.^ 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     77 

Germany  therefore  proposes  a  "lateral"  mar- 
riage. The  general  plan  is  outlined  in  the  fol- 
lowing quotation  taken  from  a  pamphlet 
published  in  Cologne,  entitled:  "The  Secondary- 
Marriage  as  only  Means  for  the  Rapid  Creation 
of  a  New  and  Powerful  Army  and  the  Purifica- 
tion of  Morality": 

"Women  in  all  classes  of  society  who  have  reached 
a  certain  age  are,  in  the  interests  of  the  Fatherland, 
not  only  authorized  but  called  upon  to  enter  into  a 
secondary  marriage,  which  is  supported  by  personal 
inclination.  Only  a  married  man  may  be  the  object 
of  this  inclination,  and  he  must  have  the  consent 
of  his  married  wife.  This  condition  is  necessary 
in  order  to  prevent  the  mischief  which  otherwise 
might  surely  be  expected. 

"The  offspring  of  these  lawful  secondary  mar- 
riages bear  the  name  of  their  mother,  and  are  handed 
over  to  the  care  of  the  State,  unless  the  mother 
assumes  responsibility  for  them.  They  are  to  be 
regarded  in  every  respect  as  fully  equal  members 
of  society.  The  mothers  wear  a  narrow  wedding 
ring  as  a  sign  of  their  patriotism.  The  secondary 
marriage  can  be  dissolved  as  soon  as  its  object 
has   been   attained." 

But,  you  may  say,  anyone  may  write  and 
distribute  a  pamphlet,  even  though  it  may 
have  an  immoral  purpose.     True  enough. 


78        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

But  the  following  is  quoted  from  a  leaflet, 
widely  circulated  among  the  soldiers  at  the 
front,  not  over  the  objection  but  with  the 
consent  and  active  cooperation  of  the  officers: 

"Soldiers,  a  grave  danger  assails  the  Fatherland 
by  reason  of  the  dwindling  birth  rate.  The  cradles 
of  Germany  are  empty  to-day;  it  is  your  duty  to 
see  that  they  are  filled. 

"You  bachelors,  when  your  leave  comes,  marry 
at  once  the  girl  of  your  choice.  Make  her  your 
wife  without  delay. 

"The  Fatherland  needs  healthy  children. 

"You  married  men  and  your  wives  should  put 
jealousy  from  your  minds  and  consider  whether 
you  have  not  also  a  duty  to  the  Fatherland. 

"You  should  consider  whether  you  may  not 
honorably  contract  an  alliance  with  one  of  the 
million  of  bachelor  women.  See  if  your  wife  will 
not  sanction  the  relation. 

"Remember,  all  of  you,  the  empty  cradles  of 
Germany  must  be  filled." 

Here  is  a  direct  invitation  to  the  individual 
issued  to  him  with  the  sanction  of  the  State, 
to  disregard  the  sanctity  of  his  marriage  vows 
and  to  contract  just  such  an  alliance  as  the 
pamphleteer  who  was  first  quoted  has  ad-, 
vocated. 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     79 

And  if  this  be  not  enough,  copies  of  the  fol- 
lowing circular  letter  have  been  found  on  a 
number  of  German  prisoners  captured  by  the 
British  during  the  last  two  years: 

"On  account  of  all  able-bodied  men  having  been 
called  to  the  colors,  it  remains  the  duty  of  all 
those  left  behind,  for  the  sake  of  the  Fatherland, 
to  interest  themselves  in  the  happiness  and  health 
of  the  married  women  and  maidens,  by  doubhng 
or  even   trebling  the   births. 

"Your  name  has  been  given  us  as  a  capable  man, 
and  you  are  herewith  requested  to  take  on  this  office 
of  honor,  and  to  do  your  duty  in  a  proper  German 
way.  It  must  here  be  pointed  out  that  your  wife 
or  fiancee  will  not  be  able  to  claim  a  divorce;  it  is 
in  fact  hoped  that  the  women  will  bear  this  discom- 
fort heroically  for  the  sake  of  the  war.     You  will 

be  given  the  district  of  .     Should  you  not 

feel  capable  of  carrying  on  the  task  allotted  to  you, 
you  will  be  given  three  days  in  which  to  name  some 
one  in  your  place.  On  the  other  hand,  if  you  are 
prepared  to  take  on  a  second  district  as  well,  you 
will  become  'vrek  ofizier    and  receive  a  pension. 

"An  exhibition  of  photographs  of  women  and 
maidens  in  the  district  allotted  to  you  is  to  be  seen 

at  the  office  of .    You  are  requested  to  bring 

this  letter  with  you.  Your  good  work  should  begin 
immediately.  A  full  report  of  results  to  be  sub- 
mitted by  you  after  nine  months." 


8o        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Proof,  too,  that  these  instructions  are  being 
carried  out  is  abundant.  We  may  disregard, 
if  we  are  so  incHned,  the  testimony  of  returned 
travelers.  We  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  the 
number  of  illegitimate  births  during  1917 
showed  an  increase  of  25  per  cent,  over  1916; 
and  that  a  high  German  authority  found  it 
necessary  to  defend  the  statistics  on  the  ground 
that  it  proved  the  fundamental  morality  of  the 
German  people — they  were  not  practising  birth 
control. 

The  next  development  concerned  the  women 
who  have  been  widowed  through  the  war  and 
the  men  who  have  been  so  crippled  as  to  be  of 
no  further  use  in  the  war  area.  The  burgo- 
masters of  the  various  German  towns  have 
been  instructed  to  obtain  a  list  of  all  war 
widows  in  the  districts  presided  over  by  them, 
a  list  of  all  cripples  being  furnished  by  the 
authorities.  Advertisements  are  then  to  be 
placed  in  papers  known  to  be  read  by  women 
generally,  for  wives  for  the  deserving  cripples. 
Thus,  playing  the  r6le  of  Cupid,  the  beneficent 
Government  will  bring  together  Venus  and 
Adonis  and,  as  is  stated  in  official  instructions, 
sow  the  seed  of  a  new  generation  which  will,  in 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad     8i 

the   fullness   of  its   manhood,   take   upon   its 
shoulders  the  national  defense. 

Finally,  in  the  discussion  of  population,  we 
come  to  Germany's  purpose  in  Africa.  In 
November  191 7,  the  semi-official  Cologne  Ga- 
zette announced  that  Germany,  in  addition  to 
recovering  her  own  African  colonies,  must  take 
over  those  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Belgium, 
and  Portugal.  This  was  not  mere  braggadocio. 
It  was  put  out  in  all  seriousness  as  a  means  of 
meeting  Germany's  most  crying  need.  The 
Colonial  troops,  this  paper  argues,  have  proven 
their  value  in  the  war  in  two  ways:  first,  they 
have  been  a  material  addition  to  the  forces  in 
Europe  and  have  given  an  excellent  account  of 
themselves  on  the  battle  field;  second,  they 
have  been  proven  thoroughly  competent  to  de- 
fend their  own  land  against  attacks  from  the 
outside  and  thus  have  guaranteed  the  title  to 
their  land  in  its  present  holders.  If  Germany 
had  had  a  Colonial  army  five  times  the  size  of 
the  one  she  possessed,  the  argument  continues, 
the  Allies  would  not  have  been  able  to  bring 
their  Colonial  forces  into  Europe.  Therefore, 
"Germany  must  have  a  strong  Colonial  army 
to  strengthen  her  position  and  at  the  same  time 


82        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

weaken  that  of  her  enemies,  who  must  never 
again  be  allowed  to  bring  colored  troops  to 
their  aid  in  Europe."  This  factor,  however, 
need  not  be  seriously  considered.  It  is  inter- 
jected here  merely  to  show  how  present-day 
German  thought  is  inclined. 

In  concluding  the  discussion  of  Germany's 
available  population  for  a  future  war,  we  must 
regard  with  anxious  eyes  the  situation  in 
Russia,  unstable  and  kaleidoscopic  as  it  is. 
Under  the  terms  of  the  treaty  which  the  Bolshe- 
viki  made  with  Germany  in  February  191 8 
Germany  has  complete  control  of  Poland, 
Courland,  Lithuania  and  practically  all  of 
Livonia,  which  provinces  contain,  or  did  con- 
tain in  1914,  a  population  of  approximately 
twenty-five  million  men.  Ukraine,  nominally 
an  independent  governmental  entity,  is  par- 
tially Germanized  and  the  process  now  under 
way  will  be  completed  within  the  year. 
Ukraine  also  has  a  population  of  about  the 
same  volume,  so  that,  through  the  Russian 
operations,  Germany  has  acquired  control  of 
a  population  of  fifty  milHon,  which  popula- 
tion, unless  the  Entente  succeed  in  amelio- 
rating Russia's  situation,  threatens  to  provide 


Calais-Bagdad  Not  Hamburg-Bagdad      83 

Germany  with  a  large  army  for  the  next  war 
against  us. 

We  may  therefore  sum  up  the  situation  as 
it  will  exist  after  the  close  of  the  present  war 
according  to  the  German  plans — and  as  it  will 
exist  in  fact,  unless  Germany  is  decisively 
beaten  in  the  field. 

Germany,  her  territory  unscathed  by  the 
present  war,  will  rapidly  recover  from  its 
effects,  while  her  continental  enemies,  so  bit- 
terly ravished  by  war's  sweep,  will  lag  far  behind 
in  the  process  of  regeneration.  Under  these 
conditions  the  mobilization  of  her  man  power 
and  that  of  her  vassal  allies  will  place  an  over- 
whelming army,  all  German  trained  and  Ger- 
man equipped,  under  the  German  command, 
to  be  thrown  against  her  weakened  adversaries 
in  Europe.  This  time,  according  to  the  Germans' 
plan,  the  struggle  is  to  be  short.  There  is  to  be 
no  miscalculation,  no  Marne,  no  Verdun. 

Then  the  real  German  aim— not  Hamburg- 
Bagdad  but  Calais-Bagdad — is  to  be  achieved; 
and  out  of  the  present  war  will  have  sprung 
the  World  Power  of  which  the  Pan-German 
League  has  been  dreaming  since  1870  and  of 
which   Bernhardi  wrote  in   191 2. 


CHAPTER  V 

"world    EMPIP.E    OR   DOWNFALL** 

The  developments  in  Russia  have  given  to 
Germany's  eastward  expansion  a  greater  im- 
portance than  even  the  Pan-German  writer 
or  Chancellor  Michaelis  even  hoped.  No  con- 
clusions as  to  the  ultimate  outcome  of  Russia's 
difficulties  can  be  safely  drawn;  the  Rus- 
sians present  the  uncertain  element  in  the 
situation.  But  the  cloud  which  obscures 
Russia's  future  from  our  view  does  not  conceal 
Germany  in  its  shadow.  Germany's  intention 
and  her  object  stand  out  clear  in  the  picture's 
foreground. 

To  say  that  Germany  is,  in  its  dealings  with 
Russia,  indulging  in  an  orgy  of  Pan-Germanism; 
that  the  extent  of  the  Russian  collapse  intoxi- 
cated the  German  leaders  and  sent  them  reeling 
about  Berlin,  thoroughly  drunk  with  dreams 
of  power  and  conquest,  is  to  state  the  truth 
in  general  terms.  But  details  are  needed  to 
give  the  true  picture. 

84 


"World  Empire  or  Downfall"  85 

When  Finland,  Ukraine  and  the  Caucasus 
declared  their  independence  and  attempted 
to  set  up  governments  of  their  own,  Germany 
not  only  encouraged  but  through  skillful  propa- 
ganda brought  these  results  about.  Germany's 
■penchant  for  swallowing  small  states  is  well 
known  even  though  her  ability  to  digest  them 
is  narrow  and  limited — Russia  has  always  been 
Germany's  fear.  The  great  numbers  of  the 
Russian  people,  the  unlimited  resources  in 
food  and  raw  materials  of  all  kinds,  the  vast 
extent  of  her  territory,  have,  in  addition  to 
exciting  German  cupidity,  filled  Germany  with 
dread  lest  in  some  future  day,  this  vast  Russian 
wealth  be  mobilized  for  war  and  turned  against 
the  Teutonic  powers.  So,  to  avoid  repetition, 
Germany  first  exerted  her  efforts  toward  a 
decentralization  of  Russian  power  through  the 
simple  expedient  of  dividing  Russia  into  a 
number  of  small  groups,  none  of  which  can 
have  the  power  to  resist.  Then  by  Germanizing 
each  group  independently  Germany  hopes  to 
keep  the  so-called  independent  states  as  German 
vassals.  Therefore  when  Russia  herself,  and 
elements  in  Finland  and  Ukraine,  resented  the 
separation  and  took  up  arms  against  the  new 


86        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

governments,  Germany  rushed  to  their  aid 
with  a  fanfare  of  trumpets  and  grandiloquent 
manifestoes  of  self-laudation  for  protecting 
against  despotic  aggression  new  states  who 
desired  to  apply  to  themselves  the  principle 
of  the  right  of  peoples  to  determine  their  own 
government.  But  by  this  process  of  sending 
German  troops  into  these  states,  Germany 
means  to  graft  herself  permanently  onto  their 
organization.  She  intends  to  take  root  with 
them  and  become  a  fixed  part  of  them. 

In  the  case  of  Finland  the  eventual  result  at 
which  Germany  aims  is  the  control  of  Scandi- 
navia and  the  conversion  of  the  Baltic  Sea  into 
a  German  lake.  If  the  German  plans  succeed 
Norway  and  Sweden  will  find  it  impossible  to 
maintain  more  than  a  nominal  independence. 
On  land  they  could  not  face  a  victorious  Ger- 
many and  their  safety  at  sea  must  depend  on 
the  British  navy.  In  so  far  as  their  resources 
and  raw  materials  are  concerned,  coercion  will 
place  them  entirely  at  Germany's  disposal  when 
and  as  they  may  be  required,  unless  the  Allied 
armies  break  up  this  whole  German  scheme. 
This  is  a  most  important  consideration  in 
connection  with  a  future  war.     Sweden  has  a 


"World  Empire  or  Downfall"  87 

wealth  of  raw  materials  which  in  case  of  war 
Germany  wishes  to  have  available.  The  most 
important  of  these  is  a  very  high-grade  iron 
ore  of  which  Sweden  produces  annually  about 
eight  million  tons.  In  the  matter  of  food  sup- 
plies, the  net  exports  of  cattle,  pigs,  and  animal 
food — a  product  of  which  Germany  has  always 
need — aggregate  annually  about  ninety  million 
tons. 

Ukraine  is  of  even  greater  importance,  aside 
from  the  question  of  population  which  has 
already  been  referred  to.  The  present  war  is 
largely  a  war  for  raw  materials — Germany 
wants  to  be  self-supporting;  she  wants  to 
include  within  her  boundaries,  or  have  fastened 
to.  her  by  bonds  which  only  she  can  loosen, 
territory  capable  of  producing  all  materials 
needed  for  home  consumption  in  both  war  and 
peace.  In  1914  there  was  a  serious  shortage. 
German  imports  were  heavy  both  of  food- 
stuffs and  other  basic  materials.  At  least  in 
so  far  as  food  is  concerned,  Ukraine  can  fill 
the  want.  Although  comprising  but  one- 
seventh  of  the  Russian  population,  Ukraine 
produces  one-third  of  all  Russian  grain,  and  one- 
half  of  all  Russian  livestock.    The  great  wealth 


German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 


RUSSIA  AND  THE  RESOURCES  GERMANY 
The  two  battle  lines  enclose  the  area  occupied  by  German  troops 
were  being  discussed.  The  important  industrial  centers  of 
difficulty  in  delivering  what  supplies  they  may  have  to  the  Cen- 

Black  Sea  and  the 


'World  Empire  or  Downfall'*  89 


MEANS  TO  ORGANIZE  FOR  HER  OWN  BENEFIT 
while  various  peace  negotiations  on  the  basis  of  no  annexations 
Ukraine,  although  not  served  by  many  railroads,  will  have  little 
tral  Powers    because  of  the  excellent  water  route  through  the 
Danube  River 


90        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

of  Russia's  potential  iron  supply  and  90  per 
cent,  of  Russia's  coal  supply  also  are  found 
in  Ukraine.  In  the  next  war,  therefore,  as  the 
Germans  plan  it,  Russia  would  be  helpless  with 
Ukraine  in  Germany's  hands. 

Strategically  Ukraine  is  of  equal  importance. 
Reference  to  a  map  of  Russia  will  show  Ukraine 
stretching  eastward  from  Russian  Poland,  along 
the  Black  Sea  to  the  western  boundary  of  the 
Don  Cossack  country.  Practically  the  full 
length  of  Ukraine  is  east  of  the  new  Russian 
border  and  is  perpendicular  to  it. 
,  The  configuration  of  the  Russian  boundary, 
as  created  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  is  such  that 
with  Ukraine  and  Germany  working  together, 
the  heart  of  Russia  is  placed  between  the  jaws 
of  a  pincers  with  no  possible  defense  against 
their  closing;  a  rift  in  the  defense  either  on  the 
western  or  southern  boundary  line,  and  all  of 
Russia  west  of  the  meridian  of  Moscow  would 
automatically  pass  into  German  control.  Under 
the  German  plan,  the  plan  which  Germany  has 
already  carried  out  unless  it  is  overturned  by 
outside  interference,  Russia,  as  a  potential 
military  obstacle  to  Germany's  world  dominion, 
will  not  exist.    Russia  will  be  a  country  which 


"World  Empire  or  Downfall"  91 

will  exist  only  through  Teutonic  suflFerance;  its 
population  will  be  dependent  upon  Germany 
for  the  food  it  eats  and  the  clothes  it  wears. 
It  will  be  deprived  of  the  ability  to  defend 
itself  against  attack,  even  to  develop  its  own 
resources.  There  will  be  but  one  avenue  left: 
a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Germany — commercial 
and  military — in  order  that  its  future  life 
may  be  guaranteed.  This  is  what  Germany 
intends.  The  complete  defeat  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  is  the  only  thing  that  is  sure  to 
prevent   it. 

In  the  Caucasus  we  are  faced  with  an  equal 
menace,  while  at  the  same  time  seeing,  even 
more  clearly,  Germany's  hand.  The  treaty 
which  Germany  finally  forced  upon  Russia 
involved  the  cession  to  Turkey  of  Batoum, 
Kars  and  Ardahan.  Batoum  is  the  center  of 
the  Russian  oil  industry,  which  surpasses  even 
that  of  the  United  States.  It  is  nonsense  to 
suppose  that  Germany  did  this  out  of  regard 
for  Turkey.  In  the  first  place  Germany  is  not 
interested  in  the  aggrandizement  of  Turkey 
unless  in  the  process  Germany  be  benefited. 
In  the  second  place,  the  industrial  life  of 
Turkey  makes  no  demand  on  oil,  and  has  no 


92        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

need  whatever  of  the  supply  of  Batoum  which 
is  the  bulk  of  the  entire  output  of  Russia. 

What,  then,  was  behind  the  apparent  Ger- 
man gift  to  Turkey?  The  oil  from  Batoum 
can  be  carried  over  the  Black  Sea  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Danube  and  thence  up  the  river  to  Austria 
and  Germany.  With  Germany  in  command 
of  the  Dardanelles,  as  she  is  now,  the  Black 
Sea  becomes  an  inland  waterway  not  subject  in 
any  way  to  outside  interference  and  hence 
subject  to  Germany's  exclusive  use.  Thus 
Germany  herself  can  obtain  directly  from  this 
Turkish  addition,  a  supply  of  crude  oil  not 
only  sufficient  for  peace  demands  but  for  war 
purposes  as  well. 

But  there  is  more  than  this.  If  this  cession 
of  territory  is  permitted  to  stand,  Germany 
has  acquired  a  direct  land  route  to  India  and 
the  Far  East — through  Turkey  to  Persia  and 
Afghanistan.  Her  desire  for  colonies  will  not 
let  Germany  stop  at  the  Black  Sea.  Soon  her 
hand  will  stretch  out  to  the  Pacific,  the  whole 
British  Empire  will  be  threatened;  and,  should 
Germany  not  endeavor  to  spread  westward  to 
South  America  and  even  Canada — which  she 
will  do — we  must  inevitably  become  involved 


"World  Empire  or  Downfall"  93 

through  the  Philippine  Islands — for  remember 
the  German  plan  is :    world  empire  or  downfall. 

There  is  one  other  important  raw  material 
which  the  Near  East  can  and  will  furnish  to 
Germany.  This  is  cotton.  The  blockade  of 
Germany  which  was  established  by  England  and 
is  now  perfected  by  the  United  States,  threat- 
ened to  bring  an  end  to  the  war  through 
cutting  oflP  the  base  material  for  making  ex- 
plosive. This  base  material  was  cotton  which 
furnished  the  cellulose  content  of  gun-cotton. 
Germany  anticipated  the  shortage  in  cotton, 
however,  by  making  a  wood-pulp  substitute. 
This  substitute  serves  the  purpose  but  is  not  as 
reliable  as  cotton,  a  much  higher  percentage 
of  German  shells  failing  to  explode  than  was 
the  case  when  cotton  was  used. 

If  Germany's  plans  carry  through,  such 
shortage  will  not  occur  a  second  time.  Meso- 
potamia was,  in  ancient  days,  the  world's 
greatest  cotton  belt.  Bagdad  was  the  world's 
cotton  center.  Under  Turkish  rule,  however, 
the  agricultural  value  of  Mesopotamia  sank 
rapidly  and  finally  dwindled  to  insignificant 
proportions.  To-day,  indeed,  Mesopotamia 
is  practically  a  desert  uninhabited  except  along 


94        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

its  natural  watercourses.  The  conditions  which 
made  this  country  wealthy  and  populous  can 
be  readily  restored.  It  is  almost  entirely  a 
question  of  irrigation  and  organization  and 
both  of  these  the  genius  ofGermany  can  supply. 
Long  before  the  children  which  Germany  is 
making  every  effort  to  have  brought  into  the 
world,  by  the  means  which  have  been  described, 
reach  the  age  when  they  will  be  able  to  bear 
arms,  Mesopotamia  can  be  brought  back  to 
its  former  state  of  productiveness  and  can 
furnish  Germany  with  all  the  cotton  she  may 
need  for  the  prosecution  of  war. 

In  Russia's  complete  surrender,  Rumania 
has,  very  naturally,  been  hopelessly  involved. 
And  here  also  Germany's  purpose  is  clearly 
manifest.  Germany  wants,  and  has  wanted  for 
years,  full  control  of  the  mouth  of  the  Danube 
because  of  its  relation  to  what  might  be  termed 
the  interior  water  route  to  the  Near  East. 
Therefore  the  only  terms  of  peace  which 
Rumania  could  secure  (and  Rumania  had  to 
take  what  she  could  get)  involved  the  cession 
to  Bulgaria — which  is  to  Germany — of  Do- 
brudja  and  its  northern  boundary  the  Danube, 
including  the  mouth  of  the  river.     Rumania 


"World  Empire  or  Downfall'*  95 

has  thus  had  to  give  up  her  entire  coastline 
and  is  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  by  Teutonic 
nations,  so  that  she  must  either  give  up 
her  national  existence  or  become  a  German 
vassal.  Under  these  circumstances  Germany 
would  control  all  the  oil  wealth  of  Rumania 
— which  is  very  great — and  all  Rumania's  grain, 
which  also  is  a  tremendous  asset. 

Therefore,  for  the  next  war  in  Europe, 
Germany  intends  to  be  well  fed,  intends  that 
her  army  and  her  people  shall  be  able  to  have 
the  fat  of  the  land — and  this  will  happen — if, 
of  course,  we  allow  the  present  arrangements  to 
continue.  Germany,  moreover,  has  taken  care 
to  provide  herself  with  every  item  of  raw 
material  of  which  Europe  and  Asia  boast. 
Nothing  is  to  be  lacking  except  the  one  ele- 
ment— rubber — which  is  indigenous  only  to 
tropical  climates.  It  remains  now  only  for 
Germany  to  bring  the  present  struggle  to  a 
close  so  that  she  can  begin  to  consolidate  these 
accessions  to  her  dominion,  to  stabilize  and 
perfect  their  governments  in  accordance  with 
her  interests,  and  her  preparations  for  the 
next  war  will  be  practically  complete. 


CHAPTER  VI 
Germany's  peace  drives — past  and  to  come 

We  have  seen  in  the  preceding  pages  that 
if  we  follow  to  their  logical  conclusion  the 
ambitious  dreams  of  Germany,  we  are  forced  to 
the  inference  that  the  German  plan  involves 
the  extension  of  the  Teutonic  boundary  line 
to  the  west.  We  have  seen  that  Germany  has 
been  checked  in  this  ambition,  and  that — 
since  not  in  this  war  can  it  be  realized — she  has 
deliberately  set  about,  while  this  war  is  still 
in  progress,  to  prepare  for  another  war  to  be 
fought  later;  and  further,  that  she  has  suc- 
ceeded in  forging  the  needed  links  which 
bind  to  herself  the  producers  of  all  necessary 
raw  materials  for  war,  and  hence  in  this  respect 
is  eminently  ready. 

What  then  is  Germany's  next  move?  Having 
accomplished  in  the  east  what  she  set  out  to 
accomplish,  and  recognizing  her  inability  to 
push  on  in  the  west,  Germany  wants  peace. 

96 


Germany's  Peace  Drives  97 

We  may,  then,  expect  strong  peace  waves  to 
be  sent  out,  an  intense  propaganda  to  influence 
civilian  sentiment,  in  order  that  the  ground 
may  be  prepared  for  a  definite  peace  proposal. 
This  proposal,  when  it  comes,  will  take  the 
form  of  an  offer  of  extensive  concessions  in 
the  west  in  return  for  a  free  hand  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  eastern  matters. 

But  Germany  does  not  want  peace  for  the 
sake  of  peace,  but  peace  for  the  sake  of  war; 
peace  so  that,  relatively  unscathed  by  the 
present  conflict,  she  may,  when  the  time  is 
ripe,  launch  another  war  in  which  her  full  aims 
may  be  realized. 

In  the  conferences  with  Russia  at  Brest- 
Litovsk,  peace  was  Germany's  for  the  asking. 
But  she  decHned  to  ask  it  or  to  take  it,  although 
she  expressed  herself  ready  to  accept  the 
principles  which  the  Bolshevik  delegates  put 
forth.  Failing  to  agree  on  details,  Russia 
announced  that  a  state  of  war  with  Germany 
no  longer  existed  and  disbanded  the  Russian 
army.  Without  going  through  the  formality 
of  making  a  peace  agreement,  Germany,  then, 
was  left  with  all  she  had  asked  for;  every 
point  on  which  disagreement  existed  at  Brest- 


98        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Litovsk  was  autOxiiatically  decided  in  Ger- 
many's favor. 

Did  Germany  then  take  what  she  had 
claimed  and  cease  fighting?  Quite  the  contrary. 
Ignoring  the  terms  of  the  armistice  which  she 
had  made,  just  as  she  ignored  her  treaties  in 
1914,  Germany  recommenced  hostihties,  and, 
having  deceived  the  Russians  into  disbanding 
their  army,  advanced  almost  unopposed  upon 
Petrograd.  Germany's  object  in  this  is  not  to 
hold  the  Russian  capital.  But  she  does  intend 
to  get  firmly  within  her  grasp  Courland, 
Livonia,  Lithuania  and  Ukraine  (the  last 
mentioned  of  course  under  the  guise  of  a 
separate  treaty  of  peace).  When  her  hold  on 
these  provinces  is  secure,  Germany  will,  if  she 
cannot  get  a  better  settlement,  propose  to  the 
AlHes  a  peace  based  on  a  free  hand  in  the  east 
in  return  for  the  abandonment  of  occupied 
Belgium  and  France,  with  perhaps  an  indem- 
nity in  order  that  they  may  be  reconstituted. 

Teutonic  reasoning  in  such  a  case  is  not 
difficult  to  follow.  Germany  knows  the  temper, 
the  mental  processes,  the  general  attitude  of 
the  civilian  populations  of  the  Allied  countries. 
What  would  the  great  mass  of  the  American 


Germany's  Peace  Drives  99 

people  feel  if  Germany  were  to  make  such  a 
proposal?  Many  of  our  people,  taught  to 
believe  that  we  are  at  war  because  Belgium 
was  invaded  and  France  struck  down;  taught 
that  we  are  fighting  for  a  governmental  prin- 
ciple, for  humanity  and  for  civilization,  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  western  Europe,  do  not  for 
the  most  part  understand  that  we  have  any 
interest  in  far-ofF  Russia,  in  more-distant  Meso- 
potamia and  Persia.  The  Balkan  States  are 
outside  of  the  realm  of  our  national  ken; 
hazily  we  remember  that  there  was  a  war  there 
in  1912;  but  what  it  was  about  and  its  rela- 
tion to  the  present  conflict  we  do  not  realize. 
We  do  not  know  that  our  interests  are  as 
closely  wrapped  up  in  the  history  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  and  in  what  happens  to  these  small 
countries  through  the  war,  as  if  they  were 
geographically  as  close  as  the  island  of  Cuba. 
Consequently,  when  Germany  comes  to  us  with 
the  proposition  that  she  will  vacate  her  western 
conquests,  will  even  pay  an  indemnity  for  the 
devastation  she  has  wrought,  will  or  will  not  the 
majority  of  us  want  peace  to  come,  believing 
that  we  have  obtained  the  results  for  which 
we  took  up  arms? 


100      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

The  same  though  In  less  degree  is  true  of  the 
mass  of  British  and  French  peoples.  But  being 
more  centralized,  not  scattered  over  an  enor- 
mous area  as  is  the  population  of  the  United 
States,  these  peoples  are  more  easy  to  reach 
and  to  teach. 

But  if  America  demands  peace,  France  and 
England  may  have  to  follow  our  lead.  It  is 
doubtful  now  if  either  nation  could  stand  the 
blow  of  America  making  peace  with  Germany. 
And  yet  that  is  what  Germany  is  trying  to 
accompHsh.  She  is  willing  to  go  to  any  lengths 
to  Induce  us  to  withdraw  from  the  struggle, 
feeling  sure  that,  in  such  event,  France  and 
England  will  have  no  choice.  With  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  German  aims  in  Russia  therefore, 
we  shall  see  a  tremendous  effort  on  the  part 
of  Germany  to  obtain  peace,  with  France  and 
Belgium  held  out  as  baits. 

This  procedure  is  nothing  new.  At  various 
times  during  the  past  two  years  Germany 
has  done  the  same  thing.  Having  obtained 
In  the  east  what  she  desired — and  this  was 
accomplished  before  the  end  of  191 5 — Germany 
has  seized  every  occasion  that  seemed  propitious 
to  sound  the  Entente  on  a  peace  program. 


Germany's  Peace  Drives  loi 

These  occasions  have  in  almost  every  case 
been  signalized  by  a  German  victory.  Let  us 
see  how  well  they  have  synchronized.  Germany 
was  told  at  the  Marne  that  she  was  not  to  be 
permitted  to  win  the  war.  Thrown  back  from 
Paris,  she  stretched  out  her  hand  for  Calais, 
only  to  have  her  knuckles  rapped  at  the  Battle 
of  Ypres.  Later,  the  other  hand,  stretching 
again  at  Calais,  was  forced  to  be  withdrawn, 
smarting  with  the  pain  of  another  rapping, 
delivered  also  at  Ypres.  Again,  the  lesson  of 
these  battles  was  emphasized  in  Russia  before 
Riga.  After  a  triumphal  march  through  Poland, 
beginning  at  the  Dunajec  River  at  the  gates 
of  Silesia  and  ending  only  at  the  banks  of  the 
Dwina,  the  German  army,  just  as  it  was  about 
to  seize  control  of  Russia  through  a  complete 
military  decision,  was  suddenly  halted  and 
pinned  fast  at  the  great  Tirul  Marsh. 

Then  it  was  that  the  first  peace  overture 
was  made.  Germany  did  not  speak  openly  of 
course;  she  never  does.  But  the  subterranean 
channel  of  the  German  propaganda  was  used 
to  test  the  sentiment  of  the  Entente.  The 
effort,  however,  was  weak  and  non-productive. 
The  western  Allies  had  not  yet  begun  to  fight; 


I02      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

they  were  only  accumulating  power.  So  the 
seed  fell  on  sterile  soil.  After  waiting  to  give 
her  propaganda  time  to  sink  in,  Germany, 
when  she  saw  that  no  progress  was  being  made, 
pulled  in  her  horns  and  delayed  further  efforts 
for  a  more  auspicious  occasion — an  occasion 
which  she  later  attempted  to  create. 

The  attack  on  Serbia,  which  was  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  definitive  campaign  that  Ger- 
many had  fought,  was  the  next  step.  When 
the  destruction  of  the  Serbs  was  complete, 
Germany  again  bid  for  peace,  through  the 
same  channels — insidious  propaganda.  But 
this  peace  drive,  somewhat  more  forceful  than 
its  predecessor,  was  broken  on  the  rock  of  the 
Allies'  sense  of  decency  and  right,  and  as 
before,  dissolved  in  mist. 

Then  came  the  Battle  of  Verdun,  the  most 
terrific  defeat  of  the  war,  which  was  interrupted 
four  months  after  its  inception  by  the  Battle 
of  the  Somme.  This  battle  is  an  extremely 
important  consideration  in  connection  with 
the  German  peace  moves.  Teutonic  leaders 
boasted  and  sincerely  believed  that  their  lines 
on  the  western  front  were  too  strong  to  be 
successfully  attacked.  All  of  the  world's  knowl- 


Germany's  Peace  Drives  103 

edge  of  military  engineering  had  been  exhausted 
in  preparing  them  for  defense.  Germany  did 
not  even  consider  the  possibiHty  that  they 
could  be  beaten  in  to  the  point  of  endangering 
any  part  of  their  positions.  But  slowly,  yard 
by  yard,  the  French  and  British  plowed  their 
way  through,  preparing  their  attacks  with  a 
weight  of  artillery  that  Germany  did  not 
dream  they  possessed.  It  was  the  first  positive 
proof  that  Germany  had  been  given  that  their 
lines  could  be  strained  to  the  breaking  point; 
it  was  a  proof  Germany  could  not  ignore.  There 
was  no  longer  even  in  the  German  mind  the 
complete  belief  in  a  German  victory  in  the 
west.  Even  to  them  it  had  become  improbable. 
As  the  French  and  British  artillery  continued 
to  hammer  this  thought  relentlessly  into  the 
German  mind,  another  peace  propaganda  was 
started.  This  time  it  was  more  widespread, 
more  determined,  and  more  effective  than  any 
of  its  predecessors.  This  effort  was  very  in- 
sidious, far-reaching  and  well  disguised,  and  not 
altogether  unsuccessful.  It  was  at  this  period, 
in  December  1916,  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  although  disclaiming  German 
instigation,    moved    for    peace    on    the    basis 


I04      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Germany  ostensibly  desired,  a  peace  without 
victory. 

But  this  also  failed,  the  answer  of  the  Allies 
being  a  new  offensive  in  the  west,  more  pressing, 
more  disastrous  in  its  effect  on  the  German 
casualty  lists  than  the  Battle  of  the  Somme. 

Having  failed  to  obtain  results  through 
political  channels,  an  appeal  was  made  to 
the  head  of  the  Church  of  Rome,  Pope  Benedict. 
There  was  founded  in  Switzerland  in  the 
spring  of  191 7  an  organization  known  as  "The 
Catholic  International  Peace  League"  (shades 
of  the  Holy  Alliance!),  an  organization  made 
up  almost  entirely  of  German  and  Austrian 
Catholics.  A  delegation  from  this  organization 
in  the  early  summer  went  to  Rome  to  induce 
the  Pope  to  try  to  arrange  for  peace.  At  the 
same  time  all  possible  pressure  was  exerted 
through  the  person  of  the  Austrian  Emperor 
and  by  the  Austrian  cardinals.  The  result  was 
all  that  Germany  expected  in  so  far  as  the 
Pope  was  concerned.  Pope  Benedict,  in  August 
1917,  made  a  plea  to  the  warring  powers  to 
conclude  a  peace  on  the  general  basis  which  had 
been  outlined  by  President  Wilson  eight  months 
before,  a  peace  without  victory,  a  peace  the 


Germany's  Peace  Drives  105 

basis  of  which  should  be  no  annexations  and  no 
indemnities. 

But  just  as  Germany  had  failed  to  stir  up  a 
Holy  Mohammedan  war  through  the  call  of  the 
Turkish  Sultan,  so  the  mass  of  Catholics  in 
the  world  refused  to  respond  to  the  Pope's 
message.  The  truth  was  that  the  Allies  had 
by  this  time  come  to  know  Germany  and  to 
understand  her  methods.  The  lessons  which 
she  had  spent  three  years  in  teaching  had  been 
well  learned.  The  Allies  realized  that  if  they 
did  not  win  the  war,  they  would  lose  it;  they 
realized  that  if  peace  were  made  on  the  basis 
of  the  drawn  game,  with  an  ostensible  return 
to  the  status  quo  ante,  it  would  be  a  German 
peace  and  a  German  victory.  Therefore 
although  this  effort  did  elicit  a  reply — the 
position  of  the  Pope  entitled  him  to  that  no 
matter  in  whose  interests  his  proposals  were 
made — the  attempt  to  obtain  peace  went  the 
way  of  its  predecessors. 

And  then  early  in  191 8  arose  the  Russian 
situation,  Russia  thoroughly  in  the  grip  of  the 
Teutonic  hordes;  Russia,  without  a  force  of 
any  kind,  however  meager,  to  oppose  a  German 
attack,  after  Germany's  terms  of  peace  had 


io6      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

been  completely  acceded  to.  And  on  top  of 
this  came  a  terrific  German  drive  in  the  West 
to  make  the  Allies  more  receptive  to  a  new 
peace  plan. 

If  therefore  we  may  judge  from  historical 
precedents  which  this  war  has  already  fur- 
nished us  with,  we  shall  sooner  or  later  see  a 
renewal  of  this  peace  propaganda  in  a  more 
virulent  form  than  ever.  On  our  answer  to 
this  proposal — and  I  am  speaking  to  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Italy  as  well  as  to  the 
United  States — will  depend  the  fate  of  the 
world;  on  our  answer  will  rest  the  decision 
as  to  whether  international  right  shall  prevail 
over  brute  force  and  lustful  aggression,  whether 
the  world  shall  continue  to  be  inhabited  by 
free  peoples,  or  whether  it  shall  become  Teu- 
tonic to  the  complete  obliteration  of  all  other 
nationality  and  race.  For  if  Germany  is  per- 
mitted to  emerge  from  this  war  with  a  profit, 
whether  it  be  east  or  west;  if  she  is  permitted  to 
make  peace  without  it  having  been  drilled  into 
the  German  mind  that  war  does  not  pay,  she 
will  fight  again  as  soon  as  she  can  get  ready, 
and,  this  next  time,  will  achieve  her  ambitions 
in  full. 


CHAPTER  VII 

GERMAN     HOSTILITY     TO     THE     UNITED     STATES 
BEFORE   THE    PRESENT   WAR 

If  within  the  next  twenty-five  years,  Germany 
should  launch  another  war  on  Europe,  what 
would  be  the  effect  on  America?  Why  should- 
we  be  concerned  with  it?  Previous  to  August 
1914,  there  existed  a  popular  superstition, 
usually  referred  to  as  Germany's  traditional 
friendship  for  the  United  States.  This  super- 
stition seems,  however,  to  owe  its  origin  to 
Prussia's  traditional  hatred  of  England  rather 
than  to  any  feeling  of  friendship  for  a  people 
whose  every  principle  of  government  was 
directly  antithetical  to  all  that  Prussia  repre- 
sented. During  the  American  Revolution, 
Frederick  the  Great  stated  to  an  American  dip- 
lomat that  Prussia  rejoiced  at  every  American 
victory.  This  was  accepted  as  indicative  of 
a  real  feeling  of  friendship  and  was  the  begin- 
ning of  the  fiction  which  eventually  was  to 

107 


io8      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

conceal  the  true  Prussian  state  of  mind.  But 
Prussia — and  the  Prussia  of  the  beginning  of 
the  19th  century  is  truly  the  Germany  of  the 
20th — as  a  matter  of  fact  has  not  only  been 
secretly  hostile  to  us  almost  from  the  beginning 
of  our  existence  as  a  nation,  but  has  at  heart 
despised    us. 

We  achieved  our  indepenaence  when  Europe 
first  began  to  throb  with  the  birth  pains  of  a 
new  republican  spirit,  when  the  trenchant  pen 
of  Voltaire  had  begun  to  loosen  the  foundations 
upon  which  rested  the  French  monarchy  of  the 
Bourbons.  Prussia  heard  the  rumbhngs  of  this 
new  spirit  with  alarm.  The  very  life  of  her 
entire  system  depended  upon  monarchy.  Wor- 
shiping even  then  the  gospel  of  the  rule  of 
might,  of  force,  she  believed  that  the  only 
essential  possession  of  a  state  was  a  supreme 
military  organization.  Having  that,  all  else 
could  be  attained.  But  such  an  organization 
was  incompatible  with  republicanism.  Gov- 
ernment by  the  people,  rather  than  by  a  single 
ruler  responsible  only  to  himself,  is  not  an 
organization  calculated  to  plan  aggressive  war. 
Government  by  autocracy  labors  under  no 
such   disadvantages.    Where   one   man's    voice 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States    109 

is  law,  where  there  is  no  accountability  to 
an  electorate,  the  mobilization  and  directing 
of  all  the  resources  and  all  the  power  of  a 
state,  the  unification  and  concentration  of  its 
effort — all  toward  one  goal — is  entirely  possi- 
ble and  is  not,  indeed,  particularly  difficult 
of  accomplishment.  Moreover,  such  a  govern- 
ment is  soulless,  it  is  machine-made  and 
machine-directed.  But  it  is  a  perfect  war- 
making  conception.  A  repubhc,  or  a  democracy, 
is  adapted  primarily  to  the  practice  of  the 
arts  of  peace.  It  is  to  a  certain  extent  ideal- 
istic; and,  pitted  against  monarchy  on  the 
battlefield,  works  with  obvious  disadvantage. 

All  this  Prussia  realized,  and,  being  an  essen- 
tially war-making  state,  was  visibly  perturbed 
at  the  possibility  of  the  republican  spirit  in- 
fecting not  her  own  population  alone,  but  also 
that  of  the  other  German  states,  not  yet  united 
under  the  Confederation. 

The  events  of  the  decade  following  the  war 
of  1 81 2  tended  to  augment  greatly  this  per- 
turbation. The  spirit  of  independence,  the  love 
of  individual  liberty  which  had  first  infected 
us  and  had  led  us  to  break  from  the  empire  of 
George  III  (a  German  Prince,  be  it  noted,  and 


no      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

not  an  Anglo-Saxon)  and  later  inspired  the 
people  of  France,  quickly  spread  to  other  parts 
of  the  world.  The  Spanish  colonies  in  South 
America,  taking  advantage  of  Spain's  pre- 
occupation in  the  affairs  of  Europe,  threw  off 
the  Spanish  yoke,  and  declared  their  inde- 
pendence. To  Prussia,  this  proved  the  breaking 
point.  The  principles  advocated  by  those 
favoring  republicanism  were  becoming  too 
popular;  so  Prussia  took  the  first  step  to 
crush  the  spirit  of  popular  government  once 
for  all  and  to  stop  the  schismatic  and  heretical 
disbelief  in  the  divine  right  of  kings  to  rule. 

Under  the  guise  of  promoting  the  interests 
of  Christianity,  the  King  of  Prussia  effected 
a  combination  with  the  Emperor  of  Austria — 
another  autocrat — and  Alexander  of  Russia, 
a  religious  fanatic;  this  combination  being 
known  as  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  real  object 
of  this  alliance  was  anti-Christian.  It  was  not 
religious  but  political — to  put  down  the  in- 
surrections which  were  rampant  in  the  Spanish 
colonies,  and  to  check  the  growth  of  republican 
tendencies  throughout  the  world.  Since  the 
United  States,  by  its  action  in  1776,  was 
truly    the    cornerstone    of   the    great    temple 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States    iii 

of  personal  freedom,  it  was  really  at  the 
United  States,  its  Declaration  of  Independence, 
and  its  constitutional  rule  that  the  Prussian 
blow  was  aimed;  not  at  the  Government  itself, 
but  at  the  principle  on  which  the  Government 
was  founded.  It  was  the  first  act  of  German 
antagonism. 

Fortunately  for  us,  the  British  Premier,  Lord 
Canning,  became  aware  of  the  real  nature  of 
the  Prussian  scheme  and,  acting  on  the  in- 
formation furnished  by  him  to  our  Minister, 
Mr.  Rush,  President  Monroe  announced  to  the 
world  the  policy  by  which  we  proposed  to  be 
governed  in  all  questions  between  Europe  and 
the  American  continent.  This  policy,  our 
code  of  foreign  relations,  is  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and,  be  it  noted,  it  was  leveled  at 
Prussian  aggression.  That  was  the  beginning 
of  Prussia's  virulent  hostility  toward  us.  It 
was  often  cloaked,  often  tempered  by  expedi- 
ency to  the  point  where,  as  a  people,  we  felt 
that,  at  bottom,  we  had  the  German  friendship 
and  good  will.  But  underlying  all  German 
protestations  of  attachment  to  us  and  to  our 
institutions,  there  was  always  a  bitter  resent- 
ment at  our  balking  the  purposes  of  the  Holy 


112      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Alliance  and  frustrating  the  scheme  to  place 
and  keep  the  greater  portions  of  the  Ameri- 
can continent  under  the  rule  of  European 
autocracy. 

Prussia  alone  was  not  strong  enough  as  a 
power  to  take  openly  a  position  of  unfriendliness. 
Our  rapid  growth,  our  potential  strength,  and 
the  development  of  our  huge  resources  pro- 
hibited such  a  position.  Moreover,  the  Prussian 
attitude  was  not  reflected  in  the  other  German 
states.  But  after  the  formation  of  the  present 
German  Empire  in  1870  with  Prussia  the 
dominant  state  and  the  King  of  Prussia  the 
nation's  emperor,  the  smoldering  embers  of 
the  resentment  over  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
were  fanned  into  flame  and  Germany's  attitude 
changed  into  a  constant  challenge  of  our 
rights,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  being  the  prin- 
cipal object  of  attack. 

The  new  Germany  came  into  existence  under 
the  guidance  of  Bismarck,  the  most  astute  as 
well  as  the  most  unscrupulous  statesman  of 
Europe.  He  saw  as  an  end  only  the  aggrandize- 
ment of  Germany,  and  to  him  the  end  justified 
the  means,  whatever  they  might  be.  He  saw  in 
the  United  States  only  a  step  by  which  Ger- 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States     113 

many  might  rise  to  still  greater  power,  American 
wealth  was  to  him  part  of  the  potential  wealth 
of  Germany,  which,  when  the  time  was  ripe, 
she  would  reach  out  her  hand  and  take.  His 
whole  philosophy  about  America  was  summed 
up  in  his  remark  that  the  United  States  was 
a  fat  hog,  waiting  to  be  stuck,  and  he  might 
have  added,  that  Germany  some  day  would 
try  to  do  the  sticking.  He  was  the  first  Pan- 
German  and  from  this  protagonist  has  come  the 
dream  of  German  world  dominion  from  which 
sprang  the  World  War.  Although  Bismarck 
and  his  successors  in  office  maintained,  for  the 
most  part,  a  semblance  of  friendship  for  the 
United  States,  there  were  constant  outcroppings 
of  hostility,  which,  if  we  had  not  been  blinded 
by  the  false  sense  of  security  furnished  by  the 
two  oceans  by  which  we  are  limited,  we  would 
not  have  been  slow  to  recognize.  And  recogni- 
tion would  have  meant  some  sensible  plan  of 
preparation  for  the  war  in  which  we  are  now 
engaged. 

Several  small  incidents  served  to  warn  our 
Government  that  this  hostility  existed  and 
that  any  show  of  friendliness  was  only  a  pre- 
tence demanded  by  expediency,  but  it  was  not 


114      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

until  1898  that  the  American  people  as  a  whole 
received  their  first  warning.  The  trouble 
started  before  we  declared  war  on  Spain, 
through  an  insult  given  by  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia  to  Admiral  Dewey  in  Hong  Kong.  An 
apology  was  forthcoming,  it  is  true,  but  the 
intention  was  evident  and  did  not  escape  Dewey 
or  the  Government. 

Later,  when  it  seemed  evident  that  we  were 
to  declare  war  on  Spain,  Germany  endeavored 
by  all  the  means  in  her  power,  to  form  against 
us  a  European  coalition  headed  by  herself  and 
Austria,  and  to  use  the  armies  and  navies  of 
the  various  states  concerned  to  forbid  our  going 
to  war.  The  real  reason  for  this  step  was  the 
same  which  prompted  Germany  to  form  the 
Triple  Alliance  which  provoked  the  Monroe 
Doctrine — to  prevent  the  spread  of  republican- 
ism on  this  continent  and  its  neighboring 
islands.  Through  the  action  of  the  British, 
who  refused  to  join  the  coalition,  the  scheme 
was  balked.  But  Germany  was  not  yet  ready 
to  acknowledge  her  defeat. 

Her  subsequent  actions  are  well  known 
though,  at  this  time,  but  little  remembered 
or  appreciated  at  their  full  value. 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States     115 

After  the  defeat  by  Admiral  Dewey's 
squadron  of  the  Spanish  squadron  at  Manila, 
and  before  the  land  defenses  of  Manila  Bay 
were  taken,  Dewey  established  a  blockade  and 
proclaimed  to  neutral  powers  the  fact  of  the 
blockade's  existence.  Under  international  law, 
when  a  blockade  is  declared  neutrals  first 
ascertain  whether  it  is  effective  and  hence 
binding,  and,  upon  assuring  themselves  that 
such  is  the  case,  must  accept  the  anchorages 
which  the  blockading  commander  assigns  to 
them.  The  German  squadron  at  Manila,  which 
was  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Von 
Diederich,  undertook  to  disregard  completely 
the  instructions  of  Admiral  Dewey  as  to  the 
location  of  his  anchorages,  a  proceeding  to 
which  Dewey  took  very  serious  objection.  In 
fact  the  German  boats  undertook  to  come  in 
and  out  of  the  Bay  as  if  no  blockade  existed  in 
theory  or  in  fact.  Finally  a  German  cruiser 
loaded  supplies  to  the  occupants  of  the  belea- 
guered Spanish  fortresses,  a  clear  violation  of 
neutrality  if  not,  indeed,  an  act  of  war.  This 
proved  the  end  of  Dewey's  patience  and  he 
sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  German  admiral 
which  was  all  but  a  challenge  to  fight.    There 


ii6      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

was  then  a  temporary  back  down.  The  Germans 
were  not  ready  to  press  the  point  too  hard, 
and  Admiral  von  Diederich  disavowed  the 
action  of  his  subordinate. 

Later,  however,  when  Dewey  began  the 
battle  of  Manila  Bay  by  driving  his  ships  in 
against  the  Spanish  fortresses,  the  Germans 
attempted  to  get  Dewey's  fleet  between  them- 
selves and  the  Spanish  batteries.  Whether  it 
was  the  intention  to  open  fire  simultaneously 
with  the  Spanish  guns  or  not,  will  never  be 
known.  Whatever  the  plan  was,  it  was  cir- 
cumvented by  the  British  fleet  which  immediate- 
ly placed  itself  between  the  German  and  the 
American  fleets  so  that  the  Germans  could 
not  fire  on  Dewey's  vessels  without  hitting 
the  British.  Germany  had  no  idea  of  chal- 
lenging the  power  of  the  British  navy,  although 
for  the  possession  of  the  Philippines  they 
might  have  tried  issues  with  ours.  Therefore 
they  fell  back  and  in  a  few  days  left  the  harbor. 
But  as  may  be  seen  the  entire  attitude  was 
one  of  open  unfriendliness  which  they  were 
ready  to  extend  to  hostility  if  a  propitious 
moment  presented  itself. 

Not  until  1902  did  Germany  make  the  next 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States     117 

positive  move  against  us.  Venezuela  owed 
to  Germany,  in  common  with  several  of  the 
other  European  powers,  large  sums  of  money 
which  Germany  persuaded  the  other  powers 
to  join  her  in  trying  to  collect.  Accordingly 
the  now  famous  Pacific  blockade  was  formed. 
But  it  developed  that  it  was  Germany's  inten- 
tion to  go  further  than  this.  She  wished  to 
occupy  at  least  a  part  of  Venezuela  temporarily, 
presumably  until  the  debt  was  paid.  It  was 
a  direct  challenge  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
but  a  challenge  which  Germany  made  alone, 
as  the  other  powers  stood  out  for  arbitration 
and  refused  to  join  in  such  an  obvious  land- 
hunting  expedition.  But  President  Roosevelt 
proved  conclusively  to  the  German  ambassador 
that  he  was  ready  to  engage  the  United  States 
in  war  for  the  protection  of  this  long-standing 
and  very  necessary  foreign  policy,  and  the 
Kaiser,  who  was  behind  the  move  from  the 
beginning,  was  forced  to  back  down  and  join 
the  other  powers  in  the  arbitration. 

Germany  has  tried  therefore  to  force  us  to 
abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Not  resting 
on  these  manifest  efforts,  however,  she  has 
been  constantly  and  for  a  long  time  preparing 


Ii8      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

the  ground  In  a  way  which  we  could  not  take 
objection  to.  In  order  to  get  her  grip  on  South 
America  just  as  she  did  in  the  case  of  Turkey 
and  tried  to  do  with  China,  she  has  sent  her 
soldiers  to  several  of  the  smaller  countries  of 
South  America  to  train  the  local  armies.  She 
has  sent  out  under  the  direction  of  her  Foreign 
Office,  large  settlements  to  Brazil  and  Argentina, 
which  are  German,  always  will  be  German, 
and  have  not  the  slightest  intention  of  permit- 
ting themselves  to  become  assimilated  with 
the  local  populations. 

Only  during  1916  and  1917  did  we  learn 
the  extent  to  which  we  were  permeated  by  her 
spy  system,  how  she  was  organized  here  in 
the  United  States  for  war  or  for  sabotage, 
how  she  had  carefully  selected  even  the  parts 
of  the  United  States  in  which  her  settlers 
should  take  root,  assembling  them  in  localities 
where  the  German  leaders  felt  they  could 
most  effectively  cooperate  against  us  in  case 
of  war.  Careful  lists  have  been  kept  of  the  men 
here  who  could  be  counted  upon  to  work  in 
the  interests  of  Germany,  and  these  men  have 
been  used  to  the  utmost.  The  now  famous 
Zimmermann   letter,   in  which   Germany  pro- 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States    119 

posed  to  give  Mexico,  in  case  of  war  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany,  large  stretches 
of  our  territory  in  return  for  cooperative  of- 
fensive measures  against  us,  is  public  property, 
still  fresh  in  our  minds. 

In  view  of  these  evidences  of  hostility,  we 
should  indeed  be  addle-pated  optimists  if  we 
did  not  realize  the  danger  we  are  in.  In  the 
opening  chapter  of  this  book,  we  have  seen  that 
Germany's  scheme  involved  expansion  to  the 
west  in  Europe.  The  relation  to  the  United 
States  of  the  Pan-German  scheme  was  not 
mentioned.  But  the  European  matter  was 
foremost  in  the  German  mind  and  was  the 
first  step  which  had  to  be  taken.  But  Germany 
did  not  intend  to  stop  there.  There  is  too 
much  wealth  in  this  "fat  hog,  waiting  to  be 
stuck,"  as  Bismarck  called  us,  not  to  excite  the 
envy  and  cupidity  of  Berlin.  And  we  know 
enough  now,  or  should  know  enough,  to  realize 
that  when  Germany  wants  anything  and  it  is 
worth  the  price,  she  will  go  to  war  to  get  it. 
The  only  question  involved  is:  Will  it  pay? 
not  Is  it  right? 

If  we  had  remained  neutral,  and  Germany 
won  the  war,  Germany  would  have  the  guns 


I20      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

and  we  would  have  the  money.  To  this  state 
of  affairs,  there  is  but  one  answer.  But  lest 
we  think  that  this  is  questionable,  there  may- 
be cited  several  incidents  which  will  prove  that 
Germany  would,  in  such  case,  send  her  guns 
to  get  the  money.  In  1898,  Admiral  Dewey 
was  told  by  the  German  Admiral  von  Goetzen, 
that  "in  about  fifteen  years  my  country  will 
begin  a  great  war.  Some  months  after  we  have 
done  our  job  in  Europe  we  shall  take  New 
York  and  probably  Washington,  and  we  shall 
keep  them  for  a  time.  We  shall  extract  one  or 
two  billions  of  dollars  from  New  York  and 
other  towns."  You  may  say  that  it  was  nearly 
twenty  years  ago  that  this  spirit  was  manifested. 
Even  so;  has  it  become  apparent  in  any  way 
that  this  spirit  has  changed  for  the  better? 
On  the  contrary,  has  it  not  been  carefully 
fostered  until  it  is  still  more  gross,  still  more 
unscrupulous?  The  Kaiser  himself  has  said 
to  the  American  Ambassador  that  he  will 
stand  no  nonsense  from  America  after  the  war. 
What  is  this  if  not  an  open  threat  to  dictate 
to  us  after  the  war  and  put  us  in  our  proper 
place  with  reference  to  Germany? 

But  there  is  something  more  definite  even 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States     121 

than  this,  something  of  which  our  Ambassador 
was  cognizant  and  of  which  the  Foreign  Re- 
lations Committee  in  both  the  House  of 
Representatives  and  Senate  were  apprised. 
The  Germans,  with  their  genius  for  detail, 
were  keeping  a  list  of  the  men  in  their  army 
who  were  alleged  to  be  killed  or  wounded 
through  the  use  of  American  ammunition 
supplied  to  the  Allies.  This  list  was  translated 
into  dollars  and  cents,  the  value  of  each  man 
being  made  to  depend  upon  his  rank  ajid 
station.  This  was  to  be  the  indemnity  we  were 
to  be  made  to  pay  after  the  war.  By  January 
1917,  it  had  reached  an  inconceivable  sum,  a 
sum  sufficiently  large  to  pay  the  entire  cost 
to  Germany  of  the  war.  And  we  may  be  cer- 
tain that  the  alternative  with  which  we  would 
have  been  confronted,  would  have  been  to 
pay  or  fight. 

Do  not  let  us  deceive  ourselves  that  this 
"debt"  will  be  canceled  by  the  treaty  of 
peace;  on  the  contrary  it  will  be  merely  sus- 
pended. And  if  Germany  can  succeed  in 
making  a  peace  now  that  will  permit  her  to 
fight  again,  we  shall  be  involved  in  the  next  war 
and  involved   not  in  Europe  but  in  America, 


122      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

for  Germany  will  build  her  fences  well  in 
Latin  America  before  that  time  comes  and  will 
fight  us  from  the  south  as  well  as  from  the 
east.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  will  become  an 
issue  of  the  past,  Germany  will  pay  no  more 
attention  to  it  than  she  has  done  to  her  treaties 
with  Belgium  and  with  us  since  1914. 

Wide  preparations  have  already  been  made 
in  Latin  America  to  aid  Germany  in  this 
American  enterprise.  Large  colonies  of  Ger- 
mans have  been  established  in  many  South 
American  states,  and  colonists,  under  the 
direction  of  Berlin,  have  formed  compact 
centralized  settlements,  with  their  own  munic- 
ipal organizations,  their  own  clubs  (among 
which  are  many  rifle  clubs) — waiting  only  the 
German  word  to  strike.  In  Peru,  for  example, 
there  are  two  thousand  Germans;  in  Paraguay, 
three  thousand;  in  Colombia,  three  thousand; 
in  Venezuela,  five  thousand;  in  Uruguay, 
five  thousand;  in  Chili,  fifteen  thousand; 
in  Argentina,  sixty  thousand;  in  Brazil,  four 
hundred  thousand.  These  numbers  are  not 
scattered  over  the  various  states,  be  it  remem- 
bered; they  are  concentrated,  mobilized  in 
fact,  waiting  but  for  orders  from  Berlin. 


German  Hostility  to  the  United  States     123 

The  following  appears  in  Otto  Tannenberg's 
work,  "Greater  Germany,  the  Work  of  the 
Twentieth  Century,"  published  in  191 1: 

"Germany  will  take  under  her  protection  the 
republics  of  Argentina,  Chili,  Uruguay,  and  Para- 
guay, the  Southern  third  of  BoHvia  .  .  .  and  also 
that  part  of  Southern  Brazil  in  which  German 
culture  prevails.  .  .  .  Chili  and  Argentina  will  pre- 
serve their  language  and  their  autonomy,  but  we 
shall  require  that  German  be  taught  in  the  schools 
as  a  second  language.  Southern  Brazil,  Paraguay 
and  Uruguay  are  countries  of  German  culture  and 
there  German  will  be  the  national  tongue." 

Should  this  prophecy  ever  be  fulfilled,  we 
shall  again  have  to  fight  for  independence, 
and,  as  before,  it  will  be  against  the  aggression 
of  a  Teuton  prince. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

NO  PEACE  WITHOUT  VICTORY 

The  foregoing  pages  have  depicted  a  condi- 
tion which  threatens  the  future  peace  of  the 
world.  At  a  moment  when  we  see  the  world 
torn  to  pieces  in  the  most  Titanic  struggle  of 
history;  when  we  see  being  poured  out  upon  the 
battlefields  of  Europe  the  lives  of  the  world's 
best  and  bravest  men,  and  all  of  the  world's 
treasure;  when  we  are  called  upon  to  send  our 
beloved  sons  into  the  maw  of  the  cannon's 
mouth,  and  to  endure  ourselves  suffering  and 
want  in  order  that  our  men  may  "carry  on"; 
in  such  a  situation  we  see,  formed  from  the 
breath  of  a  foul,  barbaric  nation,  the  hellish 
specter  of  another  war  to  be  fought  as  soon  as 
the  monster  can  complete  the  preparations 
even  now  going  on.  We  see  this  future  struggle 
waged  for  the  same  cause  as  that  for  which  we 
are  now  engaged,  for  peace,  for  civilization,  for 
the   right   of  future   generations   to   live    and 

124 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  125 

breathe  God*s  free  air  without  Teutonic  sanc- 
tion. 

There  is  but  one  solution  to  the  awful  problem 
which  confronts  us.  Regardless  of  the  cost  in 
men  and  treasure,  this  war  must  go  on  and  on 
until,  through  victory,  we  can  so  dictate  the 
terms  of  peace,  that  Germany  cannot  fight 
again  and  throw  the  entire  world  into  another 
such  paroxysm  of  blood  and  slaughter.  But 
before  such  terms  can  be  drawn  up,  there  are 
certain  underlying  facts  we  must  understand 
lest  we  be  drawn  into  a  premature  peace, 
thinking  we  have  attained  the  ends  for  which 
we  are  fighting  when  we  have  not. 

The  first  of  these  facts  is  the  nature  of  our 
enemy.  Germany  has  never  waged  a  war  for 
any  cause  but  profit.  Never  has  she  been 
stirred  to  fight  for  national  standards  or  na- 
tional ideals, — because  the  only  ideal  Germany 
possesses  is  profit.  Germany  is  the  tabernacle 
of  materialism  and  the  German  Kaiser  is  its 
high  priest.  This,  perhaps,  is  so  because  Ger- 
many has  grown  into  an  empire  solely  through 
military  conquest.  Germany  represents  not  a 
peaceful  growth  but  a  steady  accretion  formed 
by  preying  on   neighboring  states.     Worship- 


126      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

ing  only  a  money  god,  and  having  seen  that 
war  has  always  proved  for  them  a  profitable 
enterprise,  Germany  has  come  to  recognize  as 
the  guiding  principle  of  the  world,  not  the 
philosophy  of  Christ,  but  that  of  the  brute. 
Force,  brute  force,  is  their  god  and  that  only 
do  they  worship. 

Having  launched  the  present  cataclysm  for 
gain,  Germany  has  already  found  it  the  most 
profitable  venture  on  which  she  has  ever  em- 
barked.    Let  us  see  where  this  value  lies. 

First  there  is  the  matter  of  territory  and  the 
possibilities,  exclusive  to  Germany,  which  it 
opens  up.  It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to 
place  any  definite  value  in  dollars  and  cents  on 
the  vast  territory  which  Germany  has  acquired 
since  1914.  Belgium,  with  all  of  its  coal  and 
iron;  France,  with  its  great  resources  in  the  same 
materials;  Russia,  with  its  great  granaries,  its 
livestock,  its  wealth  in  minerals;  Anatolia,  with 
its  great  deposits  of  oil  and  metals;  the  value  of 
these  will  run  into  many  billions  of  dollars. 

Almost  as  valuable  is  the  exclusive  right 
which  Germany  has  obtained  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  resources  of  Turkey,  and  certain 
important   parts    of   Russia.     In    addition   to 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  127 

this  Germany  has  made  many  millions  through 
selling  the  products  of  the  French  and  Belgian 
mines  to  her  destitute  allies.  Add  further  the 
indemnities  Germany  has  levied,  her  thefts  of 
private  property  in  the  occupied  regions,  the 
vast  collections  of  art  treasures  she  has  re- 
moved and  has  sent  to  her  capitals,  and  we  have 
a  total  which  staggers  the  imagination. 

When  a  people  are  so  constituted  that  they 
are  confirmed  in  a  materialistic  philosophy,  is 
it  to  be  wondered  at  that,  when  they  find  them- 
selves so  richly  endowed  through  war  opera- 
tions, they  should  be  addicted  to  war  as  a  na- 
tional occupation?  In  Germany,  too,  we  have 
people  part  of  whom  regard  their  country  with 
a  religious  fervor  and  fanaticism  and  feel  truly, 
if  they  feel  at  all,  that  the  acts  of  Germany's 
rulers  are  in  furtherance  of  a  divine  mission 
and  that  in  consequence  any  opposition  to 
these  acts  is  of  itself  wrong.  The  other  part 
of  the  population  is  engaged  in  the  hypocritical 
trade  of  fostering  this  fanaticism,  of  fanning 
the  flame  it  has  ignited  and  of  instilling  into 
ready  minds  the  doctrine  of  Germany's  superi- 
ority over  other  peoples  of  the  world  and  her 
consequent  right  to  exercise  world  dominion. 


128      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

To  this  population,  part  fanatic  and  part  ve- 
nally  ambitious,  the  future  peace  of  the  world, 
unless  it  be  an  all-German  world,  is  without 
merit  and  unworthy  of  consideration.  The 
end  to  be  gained  is  either  the  immediate  ag- 
grandizement of  Germany  or  a  peace  which  will 
provide  a  basis  for  future  extension  of  Ger- 
many's boundaries  through  another  war  of  con- 
quest. 

It  is  useless  to  point  to  the  activities  of  the 
socialistic  and  pacifist  groups  in  Germany  as 
evidence  that  it  will  be  impossible  for  Germany 
again  to  break  the  bonds  of  peace,  and  let  loose 
the  dogs  of  war  on  a  heavily  burdened  world. 
The  German  socialist  is  not  far  removed  from 
the  Pan-German  and  the  Junker.  The  socialist 
of  Germany  had  full  opportunity  in  the  case  of 
Russia  to  prove  his  sincerity  and  force  the  hand 
of  the  Junker  party,  had  he  so  desired.  The 
Bolsheviki  of  Russia  offered  peace  on  a  basis 
which  German  socialists  claimed  was  just. 
Germany  was  waging  a  war  of  defense  and  of 
defense  only  said  the  socialists;  she  desired 
only  to  live  and  let  live;  and  to  live  within  her 
own  borders  on  terms  of  peace  with  her  neigh- 
bors.    But  the  arrant  hypocrisy  of  the  socialist 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  129 

became  apparent  the  moment  the  Russian 
army  had  voluntarily  given  up  its  power  of  re- 
sistance. Then  there  was  no  question  of  desir- 
ing peace  for  the  love  of  peace.  Gone  were  his 
scruples,  his  creed,  his  political  ideals.  His 
vision  extended  only  to  land,  the  undefended 
land  of  his  neighbor  which  he  possessed  the 
power  to  take — and  he  stretched  out  his  hand 
and  took. 

Scheidemann,  the  socialist  leader  of  the 
Reichstag,  is  the  most  obvious  hypocrite  of 
them  all,  talking  in  circles  on  general  subjects. 
When  any  question  arises  affecting  the  army 
or  the  extension  of  Germany's  boundaries 
through  theft  from  her  neighbors,  his  voice 
and  vote  are  always  at  the  disposal  of  the  mili- 
tary party.  He  votes  for  all  of  the  war  loans, 
he  is  on  record  advocating  the  retention  of 
Belgium;  his  voice  has  yet  to  be  heard  con- 
demning the  treachery  against  Russia. 

And  the  German  pacifist,  what  has  been  his 
record  on  the  war?  We  may  judge  of  this 
through  Maximilian  Harden,  the  leader  of  the 
pacifists,  the  "irrepressible  foe  of  Kaiserism" 
whom  the  Government,  so  we  are  told,  would 
give  untold  sums  to  be  rid  of,  if  only  it  dared.  As 


130      German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

if  the  Government  could  not  still  his  voice  and 
break  his  pen  if  it  so  desired!  We  have  learned 
of  the  power  of  the  German  censor;  his  un- 
questioned abihty  to  prevent  the  publication  of 
any  items  of  news  or  discussion  that  do  not 
meet  with  his  approval.  If,  then,  Harden  is 
still  printing  what  seems  republican  or  pacifist 
matter,  is  it  not  because  the  Government  wants 
it  printed?  And,  further,  is  it  not  obvious  that 
this  is  done  because  Harden  is  one  with  those 
in  power,  and  that  by  permitting  him  to  con- 
tinue in  his  present  view  the  Government  is 
merely  blinding  the  world  by  the  show  of 
liberahsm? 

If  this  seems  far-fetched,  let  us  see  who  Har- 
den was,  both  before  the  war  and  since  it  broke 
out.  Before  the  war  he  was  one  of  the  most 
rabid  of  the  Pan-Germans.  In  the  early  pages 
of  this  book  there  is  a  quotation  from  one  of 
his  articles  which  appeared  in  his  paper,  the 
Zukunfty  in  191 1;  in  the  same  year  we  find  the 
following  from  his  pen  in  the  same  journal: 

"The  hostile  arrogance  of  the  Western  Powers 
releases  us  from  all  our  treaty  obligations,  throws 
open  the  doors  of  our  verbal  prison  house  and 
forces   the   German    Empire,    resolutely   defending 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  131 

her  vital   rights,   to   revive   the   ancient    Prussian 
pohcy  of  conquest." 

In  November  1914,  we  find  this  Junker- 
pacifist  making  the  statement  which  has  already 
been  quoted  but  which  justifies  repetition: 

"This  war  has  not  been  forced  on  us  by  surprise; 
we  desired  it  and  were  right  to  do  so.  Germany 
goes  into  it  because  of  her  immutable  conviction 
that  what  she  has  accomplished  gives  her  the 
right  to  wider  outlets  for  her  activities  and  more 
room  in  the  world." 

This  attitude  was  maintained  consistently 
until  1916  when  the  possibility  of  defeat  in  the 
west  dawned.  Then  this  very  agile-minded 
gentleman  became  suddenly  converted  to  paci- 
fism and  to  a  belief  in  the  virtues  of  democracy. 
This  regeneration  synchronizes  too  well  with 
the  Battle  of  the  Somme  to  deceive  any  one 
but  a  simpleton  or  a  German.  We  may  there- 
fore dismiss  as  untenable  the  theory  that  a  war 
after  the  war  will  be  impossible  because  of  the 
opposition  by  the  sociaHsts  and  the  pacifists. 
There  will  be  no  opposition  from  these  sources; 
on  the  contrary,  there  will  be  active  cooperation 
if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  enterprise  will  pro- 
duce a  profit. 


132        German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

An  understanding  of  this  phase  of  German)' — 
the  phase  of  native,  inborn  hypocrisy — is  nec- 
essary to  a  clear  understanding  of  our  enemy 
in  this  war,  for  unless  we  do  understand  him  and 
have  a  vivid  realization  of  his  motives  and  his 
weapons,  there  is  danger  of  being  caught  in  the 
snare  he  is  already  laying  for  us — the  snare  of 
a  premature  peace. 

But  to  come  to  an  appreciation  of  the  re- 
quirements of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  which  we 
propose  to  end  the  war,  we  must  go  further;  we 
must  keep  before  our  mind's  eyes  constantly 
just  what  we  are  fighting  for.  In  so  far  as  the 
United  States  is  concerned — and  we  are  con- 
cerned to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  way 
as  the  other  Entente  Powers — we  must  realize 
that  we  entered  the  war  solely  for  self-defense 
— but  for  the  defense  of  the  future  as  well  as  of 
the  present.  The  defense  of  America  but  for 
the  moment  is  certainly  not  worth  the  sacri- 
fices of  our  men  and  the  pouring  out  of  our 
treasure.  If  future  generations  are  not  to  profit 
they  should  not  have  to  pay  the  cost,  and  it  is 
upon  them  that  much  of  the  load  will  fall.  Our 
program  must  therefore  include  the  future 
defense. 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  133 

For  the  first  time  in  our  history  we  are  called 
upon,  by  unborn  generations,  to  shake  off  the 
provinciaHsm  which  our  limiting  oceans  have 
thrust  upon  us  and  work  out  our  problem  from 
the  formula,  not  of  national  but  of  international 
peace    and    safety.     For    upon    the    peace    of 
Europe  depends  the  peace  of  the  United  States. 
Even  if  it  were  true,  which  it  is  not,  that  Ger- 
many does  not  intend  as  part  of  her  future  plan 
to  attack  us  and  extend  her  damnable  system 
into  Latin  America,  the  year  1917  has  shown 
that  it  is  impossible  for  a  great  war  to  exist  in 
Europe  without  the  United  States  being  drawn 
into  it.     Nations  to-day  are  too  closely  bound 
by  the  most  intimate  commercial  ties;  the  time 
of  passage  across  the  ocean  is  too  short  to  en- 
able any  great  power  to  remain  neutral  in  such 
a  case.     The  oceans  are  not  defensive  barriers. 
As  a  matter  of  history  they  have  brought  us 
into  four  wars  in  European  waters  before  this. 
In    1797   we   began   active   hostihties    against 
France  in  defense  of  our  right  to  the  sea.     For 
the  same  cause  we  fought  the  war  of  181 2  and 
two  conflicts  with  the  Barbary  pirates,  one  in 
1801  and  one  in  1815.     The  oceans  are  lines  of 
communication    and    so    they    must    remain. 


134       German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

Modern  invention  has  spanned  the  gap  of 
three  thousand  miles  with  a  bridge  of  but  three 
and  a  half  days.  What  affects  Europe  has 
always  affected  us.  Now  it  affects  us  more 
rapidly  and  vitally  than  ever  before.  We  have 
not  even  the  isolation  of  slow  communication. 
We  could  not  have  it  if  we  would;  we  would  not 
if  we  could. 

Since,  then,  we  are  as  intimately  concerned 
as  are  the  countries  of  Europe  both  with  this 
war  and  with  the  next,  we  must  clearly  under- 
stand the  ends  for  which  we  are  fighting  and  the 
nature  of  the  war  itself.  The  world  must  be 
made  safe  for  peace.  We  are  not  fighting  for 
governmental  forms;  in  this  war  they  mean 
nothing.  We  are  not  fighting  over  international 
boundaries;  these  mean  less.  Those  things  are 
at  stake  which  are  bigger  than  any  people,  any 
state,  any  form  of  government.  Decency, 
civilization,  Christianity  are  in  the  balance 
against  savagery,  barbarism,  paganism.  Which 
shall  rule  the  world?  The  answer  to  this  de- 
termines the  nature  of  our  battle.  We  are  not 
concerned  with  Germany's  form  of  government. 
It  is  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  genius  of  our 
institutions  to  attempt  to  dictate  to  the  people 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  135 

of  Germany  what  form  of  government  they 
should  live  under.  But  we  are  concerned  in 
the  capacity  of  that  government,  whatever 
form  it  may  take,  for  mischief.  No  nation 
has  ever  objected  to  Germany's  use  of  power; 
but  her  abuse  of  it  we  do  object  to  and  abomi- 
nate. She  has  shown  that  she  cannot  be  trusted 
with  power;  she  should  therefore  have  her  power 
shorn  from  her. 

Without  attempting  to  discuss  in  detail  the 
specific  terms  of  peace  which  will  accomplish 
this,  we  may  lay  down,  as  the  principle  to  which 
the  peace  treaty  must  conform,  this  formula: 
The  means,  the  power,  and  the  ability  to  make 
war  must  be  forever  removed  from  Germany 
and  from  all  things  German.  German  for- 
tresses must  be  wrecked,  German  munition 
plants  dismantled;  as  a  war-making  state  Ger- 
many must  cease  to  exist.  The  peace  treaty 
must  be  of  such  a  character  that,  even  though 
Germany  should  break  it,  her  power  to  do  evil, 
through  such  breach,  shall  not  exist.  There 
must  be  no  peace  without  victory. 

This  program  must  be  the  American  peace 
platform..  These  are  our  terms,  our  irreducible 
minimum.     Nor  do  they  represent  only  a  ten- 


136       German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

tative  sketch  to  be  debated  around  a  conference 
table.  And  these  terms  can  only  be  imposed 
upon  Germany  through  the  defeat,  the  disper- 
sion, or  the  capture  of  the  German  army.  To 
defeat  Germany;  to  sit  with  her,  not  at  the 
council  table  but  on  the  field  of  battle  and,  as 
we  receive  the  swords  of  her  commanders,  to 
dictate  peace — this  is  what  is  demanded  of  us. 

There  are,  however,  those  who,  in  answer  to 
the  constantly  recurring  peace  waves  which  the 
German  propagandists  send  forth,  contend 
that,  in  the  name  of  humanity,  we  should  make 
every  effort  to  bring  about  a  conference  of  the 
leaders  of  all  the  warring  powers  at  which  their 
differences  could  be  openly  discussed  and  pos- 
sibly reconciled.  To  enter  such  a  conference 
with  a  victorious  Germany — and  Germany  is 
the  victor  up  to  the  moment — would  mean  a 
surrender  of  all  we  have  fought  for  and  the 
throwing  away  of  all  the  sacrifices  that  the 
world  has  made. 

This  was  the  experience  of  Russia.  Acting 
on  a  theory  which  was  supposedly  the  expres- 
sion of  a  high  idealism,  Russia  convened  the  con- 
ference at  Brest-Litovsk,  and,  empty-handed, 
attempted    to   deal   with    a   Germany   gorged 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  137 

with  the  fruits  of  conquest.  Having  nothing 
to  exchange,  Russia  obtained  nothing.  Not 
only  did  Germany  fail  to  restore  what  she  had 
stolen,  but  she  added  to  her  thefts. 

Again  let  us  suppose  that  Germany,  at  such 
a  conference,  could  be  induced  to  give  up  with- 
out adequate  compensation  the  loot  she  has 
acquired  and  return  to  the  status  quo  ante. 
What  would  this  lead  to  ?  Merely  a  restoration 
of  the  situation  out  of  which  grew  the  present 
war.  And  he  would  be  more  than  a  sentimental 
idealist,  he  would  be  a  fool,  who,  having  seen  a 
certain  result  spring  from  a  certain  cause  or 
status,  would  deny  that  the  same  cause  or 
status  would  again  produce  exactly  the  same 
result.  And  were  another  war  to  be  fought, 
can  any  one  doubt  who  the  victor  would  be.'' 
Therefore,  as  far  as  the  civilized  world  is  con- 
cerned (and  this  does  not  include  Germany) 
the  application  of  the  "No  annexations,  no 
indemnities"  formula  would  not  bring  peace. 

Finally,  to  go  into  such  a  conference  with 
Germany  presupposes  equality  with  Germany. 
Between  Germany  and  any  decent  people  there 
is  no  common  ground;  any  more  than  there  can 
be  common  ground  between  the  lust-filled  beast 


138       German  Plans  for  the  Next  War 

that  ravishes  a  woman  and  the  husband  of  the 
victim.  To  agree  to  a  return  to  the  status  quo 
ante  would  be  to  admit  either  that  all  the  bellig- 
erents are  equally  guilty — Belgium  with  Ger- 
many; France  and  England  with  Austria;  the 
United  States,  Italy,  and  Serbia  with  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey — or  that  none  are  guilty;  that  the 
war  just  happened.  But  this,  on  its  face,  is 
ridiculous;  it  is  untrue;  and  for  the  Allies  to 
admit  it  would  be  to  place  themselves  on  a 
plane  with  Germany, — liars  and  hypocrites, 
whited  sepulchers  in  whom  honor  and  morality 
have  ceased  to  exist. 

We  therefore  must  all  come  back  to  the  prin- 
ciple that  Germany  must  be  beaten  by  force  of 
arms.  To  this  all  our  energies  must  be  exerted. 
In  no  circumstances  must  there  be  a  conference 
until  we  are  in  a  position  to  dictate  terms  by 
virtue  of  an  established  and  recognized  military 
superiority.  Better  no  peace  at  all  than  a 
premature  peace,  a  peace  by  collective  bargain- 
ing, a  peace  by  compromise — for  a  compromise 
means  defeat.  No  man  has  ever  compromised 
with  his  conscience  or  with  his  honor  without 
paying  the  price  of  ignominy,  and  it  is  not 
otherwise  with  a  nation.     Our  desire  for  peace 


No  Peace  Without  Victory  139 

for  the  sake  of  peace  is  in  every  way  laudable 
and  to  our  own  credit.  But  this  desire  must 
not  be  permitted  to  lead  us  into  the  path  of 
opportunism  and  outweigh  our  duty  to  future 
generations.  This  duty  is  plainly  visible,  clear- 
cut,  well  defined.  To  its  full  performance  we 
must  dedicate  all  that  we  are,  all  that  we  have. 
Germany  must  not  be  permitted  to  storm  the 
citadels  of  Christianity  that  she  may  erect  on 
the  altar  of  the  Church  of  Christ  the  monstrous 
idol  of  her  own  materialistic  ambition — a  world 
dominion. 


THE    END. 


THE   COUNTRY   LIFE   PRESS 
GARDEN   CITY,   N.   Y. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


MOV  2  7  1980 


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